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ABSTRACT

South Korea’s low carbon and ‘green growth’ policies possess potential regulatory
changes that reduce foreign investors’ interests and legitimate expectations concerning the
profitability of their businesses.

Although international investment law protects a

government’s right to protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such as environmental
protection, the investor-State dispute settlement provision allows foreign investors to seek
compensation for a country’s law and policies contrary to their interests. On the other
hand, investor-State dispute settlement provisions inherently have many problems. Despite
the problems, protecting both foreign investors’ interests and States’ regulatory
sovereignty is very important. For this reason, this dissertation examined why the tension
between foreign investors’ rights and States’ regulatory sovereignty arises and how to solve
this tension. This dissertation especially reviewed whether there is a possibility that U.S.
investors will bring a claim against South Korea for infringing their property rights,
because the Korean government’s environmental measures may amount to an indirect
expropriation or a breach of fair and equitable treatment under the KORUS FTA and
ultimately suggested ways to reconcile Korean environmental protection policies and U.S.
investors’ interests under the KORUS FTA.
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INTRODUCTION

In the modern world, awareness of the need for environmental protection has
become increasingly important. Many States, including both developed and developing
countries, are creating laws and policies to resolve environmental problems and issues. As
a result of these efforts, States are continuously trying to change their environmental
regulations and permits to improve their public interests, such as for environmental
protection. However, from foreign investors’ perspectives, their predictions for regulatory
stability would be reduced by changes to environmental regulations. For this reason, a
tension between foreign investors’ interests and States’ regulatory sovereignty often arises.
To clarify the legal situation for both States and foreign investors, international investment
treaties, such as free trade agreements, simultaneously provide protective provisions for
both foreign investors and States regarding environmental measures; they also seek ways
to balance between the two significant rights.
South Korea’s low carbon and ‘green growth’ policies represent the kind of
potential regulatory changes that might interfere with investors’ interests and expectations.
Additionally, the potential for green regulatory policies to interfere with investors’ property
rights could result in a paralysis of the environmental protection policies of South Korea.
This is because the interferences could lead investors to file suits claiming that the
government’s environmental regulations amounted to indirect expropriations1 and a breach
of the fair and equitable treatment standard.

“States have recognized the importance of attracting foreign direct investment and thus do not want to be
perceived as threatening those investments by means of expropriation, hence, the typical form in which they
1
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This dissertation deals with the increasingly prominent view that investment law
may sometimes create obstacles to the transition towards a green economy model, because
the green model requires significant changes to regulatory frameworks. South Korea’s low
carbon and ‘green growth’ policies represent potential regulatory changes that interfere
with investors’ interests and expectations regarding the profitability of their ventures.
Additionally, investor-State dispute settlement provisions inherently have problems, and,
as such, the provisions are a serious threat to Korean environmental law and policy.
Despite the problems, however, Korea’s FTA with the United States, Australia, Canada,
Vietnam, and China includes ISDS provisions. For these reasons, there is a natural tension
between U.S. investors’ rights and Korean environmental protection policy. Accordingly,
this dissertation suggests ways to reconcile Korean environmental protection policies and
U.S. investors’ interests under the KORUS FTA.

Chapter I of this dissertation analyzes the legal status of the KORUS FTA, the
relationship between foreign investors’ rights and States’ regulatory sovereignty, and the
current investor-State dispute settlement system’s problems. Chapter II explains the
important elements for a good environmental policy design and describes Korea’s
environmental policy problems.

Chapter III analyzes how States’ changes to

environmental regulations affect foreign investors’ legitimate expectations. In this Chapter,
various international arbitration cases are introduced and many reasonable alternatives are

occur today is that of an indirect expropriation.” ANNE K. HOFFMANN, ‘INDIRECT EXPROPRIATION,’ in A.
REINISCH, ed., STANDARD OF INVESTMENT PROTECTION 152 (2008); “The factors that can be isolated are that
there is a diminution in the value of the interest of the foreign investor in the assets, and that the time period
over which this occurs is often longer than necessary for a single act, but there are not factors that contribute
to the formulation of a single rule that describes the process.” M. SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW
ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 369 (2010).
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suggested.

In the last Chapter, this dissertation suggests ways to reconcile Korean

environmental protection policies with U.S. investors’ interests under the KORUS FTA.
Generally, this dissertation is an attempt to identify and analyze important legal issues
raised by the interactions between foreign investment and environmental protection in
contemporary international law.
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CHAPTER I.

THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE KORUS FTA & INVESTORSTATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT

1. Introduction

The purpose of this Chapter is to analyze the legal status of the KORUS FTA, the
tension between foreign investors’ rights and States’ regulatory sovereignty, and the
current Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) system’s problems. The first part of the
Chapter explains the relationship between international law and domestic law: this part
especially describes the relationship between international law and Korean Constitutional
law, and, ultimately, this part discusses where the KORUS FTA lies hierarchically in the
Korean legal system. The second part of the Chapter examines why the tension between
foreign investors’ rights and States’ regulatory sovereignty arises and how to resolve this
tension. The third part of the Chapter includes analysis of the current ISDS system’s
advantages and disadvantages. This Chapter also explains why the United States and South
Korea agreed to ISDS provisions and explains the way these ISDS provisions are embodied
in the KORUS FTA.

2. The Legal Status of the KORUS FTA

A. The Relationship between International Law and Domestic Law

There is still a debate regarding the relationship between international law and
domestic law. This debate arises from the differences in how each national legal system

11

deals with the problems caused by international law.2 International law broadly governs
the jurisdiction of States and the regulation of relationships between States.3 On the other
hand, today, international laws are involved in States’ domestic matters—affecting issues
such as the emission of greenhouse gasses and economic activities.4 A question that arises
is how international law has an impact on national systems of law. One opinion is that “the
future of international law is domestic”:5 this idea suggests a harmony between the areas
of international law and domestic legal systems—as such, international law can effectively
and naturally affect both domestic policies and economic activities.6 However, another
opinion is that international law faces an impossible barrier:7 in other words, that it cannot
apply to a domestic legal system without first having appropriate domestic procedures in
place. 8 Furthermore, general international rules do not exist regarding whether States
should apply international law into their domestic legal systems: 9 “in fact, there is no
general obligation that States perform such incorporations of international law.” 10
Domestic legal systems also do not provide specific rules concerning the relationship
between international law and domestic law.11 Confronted with these competing theories,
it is difficult to correctly explain the relationship between international law and domestic
law.

2

See Ximena Fuentes Torrijo, International and Domestic Law: Definitely an Odd Couple, 77 REV. JUR.
U.P.R. 483 (2008).
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
See Slaughter & Burke-White, The Future of International Law is Domestic (or, the European Way of Law),
47 HARV. INT'L L. J. 327-28 (2006).
7
See Ximena Fuentes Torrijo, supra note 2, at 484.
8
Id.
9
Id.
10
Id.
11
Id.
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As such, to better understand the relationship between international law and
domestic law, it is necessary to explain the concepts of monism and dualism. Monists do
not separate out international and domestic law individually, and they state that
international law applies directly to national courts;12 on the other hand, from the dualist
perspective, international law and domestic law are inherently different. 13 Dualists state
that certain actions, such as a legislative act to implement international law, are needed
before international law can apply directly to national courts. 14 Traditional dualist states
are Australia, Canada, India, Israel, and the United Kingdom. 15 Typical monist states
include Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, Russia, South Africa, and the United States.16
As mentioned in the examples, each State uses one concept—either monism or dualism—
according to its own legal system.

B. The Relationship between International Law and Korean Constitutional Law

Before describing the relationship between international law and Korean
Constitutional law, an explanation about the relationship between treaty law and domestic
law is necessary. The advent of new states, and a distrust of forming international custom,
has brought about the specified treaty laws.17 Treaty laws, such as multilateral laws and
bilateral laws, allow international law to be more flexible and create better harmony.18 As

12

See S.I. Strong, Beyond the Self-Execution Analysis: Rationalizing Constitutional, Treaty, and Statutory
Interpretation in International Commercial Arbitration, 53 VA. J. INT'L L. 499, 510 (2013).
13
Id.
14
Id.
15
See DAVID SLOSS, TREATY ENFORCEMENT IN DOMESTIC COURTS 7 (2009).
16
Id.
17
See Carlos Jose Gutierrez, Conflicts between Domestic and International Law, 30 AM. U. L. REV. 147, 149
(1980).
18
Id.
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a result, international law has increasingly featured greater classification than before. 19
“The supremacy of international law prioritizes international law over national law: when
a conflict between a treaty and domestic law arises, international law will prevail over
domestic law in the international legal order.” 20 However, in the event of a conflict
between a treaty and domestic law, the parliament’s latest explanation actually determines
which one takes priority over the other, and most States have stated that their Constitution
prevails over international law.21 Such states do not respect treaties’ supremacy; instead,
they require that the effect of international law follow from the substantive and important
values included in their national law.22 Furthermore, a treaty cannot operate alone:23 in
other words, each State’s independent government organization, such as the legislative, the
executive, or the judicial branch, must properly go through the due process procedures
vested in their national law before treaties can take effect.24

Korean Constitutional law explains the relationship between Korean domestic law
and international law. According to Section 1 of Article 6 under the Korean Constitutional
law, “Treaties duly concluded and promulgated under the Constitution and the recognized
rules of international law shall have the same effect as the domestic laws of the Republic
of Korea.” 25 This provision raises a question regarding whether Korean domestic law
means Korean Constitutional law.

If Korean domestic law does not mean Korean

Constitutional law, the question arises as to whether or not Korean domestic law means

19

Id.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 32, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
21
See ANDRÉ NOLLKAEMPER, THE EFFECTS OF TREATIES IN DOMESTIC LAW 143, 144 (2014).
22
Id.
23
Id. at 123.
24
Id.
25
Amended 1948 DAEHAN MINKUK HUNBEOB [HUNBEOB] [CONSTITION] art. 6 (1) (Oct. 29, 1987) (S. Kor.).
20
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Korean legislation. From the perspective of the majority, treaties have the same effect as
legislation. The Korean Constitutional Court and the Korean Supreme Court have stated
“that treaties stands comparison with legislation even though there are different opinions
regarding the relationship between Korean domestic law and international law.”26 In other
words, treaties are hierarchically beneath Korean Constitutional law.

They have

furthermore held that, if treaties are properly concluded and promulgated, international law
does not need to be translated into national law:27 in other words, they are just incorporated
and have effects automatically in domestic laws.28 This means that the Korean legal system
accepts monism as the proper relationship between domestic law and international law,
while provisions of the KORUS FTA are lower, hierarchically, than Korean Constitutional
law.

C. Foreign Investors’ Rights and State’s Regulatory Sovereignty

From an international investment treaties’ perspective, the protection of foreign
investors is very important. States could change their regulations existing at the time of
investment and the judicial system of the host State could end up enforcing the new
regulations—a weakness when it comes to foreign investment protection.29 When foreign
investors decide to invest, they consider not only the State’s laws but also the business
circumstances surrounding the time of the investment.30 If regulatory changes occur, or

26

Constitutional Court [Const. Ct.], 1997 Hun-Ga14 (consol.), Apr. 29, 1999 (S.Kor.).
Id.
28
Id.
29
GEBHARD BÜCHELER, PROPORTIONALITY IN INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION 186 (2015).
30
Anatole Boute, The Potential Contribution of International Investment Protection Law to Combat Climate
Change, 27 No. 3 J. ENERGY NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 333, 335 (2009).
27
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are reinforced by “the dependence of such investments on public support mechanisms and
regulatory commitments,”

31

then foreign investors’ expectations regarding their

investments would be undermined.32
However, apart from the protection of investors, “international investment law has
recently also included provisions regarding the importance of non-economic factors, such
as human, animal, and plant life or health, or the environment.” 33 In other words,
international investment law recognizes a need to find a balance between foreign investors’
rights and the regulatory sovereignty of the State. 34 There are a number of examples
featuring this idea’s implementation—“Investment agreements such as the Energy Charter
Treaty or the NAFTA began to include provisions about non-economic factors in their
preamble as follows: the parties ‘undertake each of the preceding (investment and trade
objectives) in a manner consistent with environment protection and conservation, preserve
their flexibility to safeguard the public welfare.’”35 Furthermore, the 2012 US Model BIT
explains, through its preamble, that this other purpose of the BIT is to be achieved “in a
manner consistent with the protection of health, safety and the environment.”36 This 2012
US Model BIT imposes a strict obligation on the parties—for example, “the parties do not
waive or derogate from domestic environmental or labor laws, and it mandates that the
parties ‘effectively enforce’ these rules.” 37 A new clause provides parties with more
regulatory space regarding “regulatory, compliance, investigatory, and prosecutorial

31

Id.
Id. at 346.
33
Markus Wagner, Regulatory Space in International Trade Law and International Investment Law, 36 U.
PA. J. INT'L L. 1, 35 (2014).
34
Id. at 36.
35
Id. at 37.
36
Id.
37
Id.
32
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matters, and to make decisions on the allocation of resources to enforcement about other
environmental matters determined to have higher priorities.” 38 Obviously, international
investment law has started to be interested in protecting public interests such as health and
environmental problems and has sought ways to balance between foreign investors’ rights
and the State’s regulatory framework. This idea has been reflected in many international
investment treaties.

3. International Investment Treaty

In order to provide investment protection, international investment treaties provide
foreign investors with numerous general protections. For example, they have the right to
bring disputes before international arbitration tribunals. Also, to attract foreign investors’
investment, international investment treaties provide protections to reduce the State’s
regulatory risk; in other words, the probability that the rules existing at the time of
investment will change.39 International investment laws, such as bilateral or multilateral
treaties, provide protection against possible regulatory changes and attempt to increase the
stability of the investment environment for investors40 by providing “foreign investors with
protection against expropriation and discriminatory treatment and guaranteeing them fair
and equitable treatment.”

41

For instance, without treaty protection, low-carbon

investments to protect the environment could face regulatory changes that might endanger

38

Id. at 38.
See BÜCHELER, supra note 29, at 181.
40
See Boute, supra note 30, at 335.
41
Id.
39
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their business.42 Clearly, international investment treaties give foreign investors secure
protections against the risk of regulatory intervention by the State.

On the other hand, scholars and practitioners criticize international investment
treaties as threats to the sovereignty of states in implementing their environmental
regulations.43 However, international investment law pursues the protection of investors
and investments, as well as the promotion of the general welfare through foreign direct
investment.44 For example, “investments in infrastructure projects are generally exposed
to a danger and need the infusion of a large amount of capital for a long time”; 45 as such,
they are very sensitive to political changes in the host state.46 As a result, such investors
require stability regarding the administrative decisions made by the host state.47

A. History

International investment treaties have a long history. 48 To fully explain the
advantages and disadvantages of investment treaties, this paper needs to briefly describe
the history of the bilateral investment treaty and ask whether BITs have had a positive
effect on global society, along with whether they have significantly affected the global
economy.

42

Id. at 346.
Id. at 365.
44
See Wagner, supra note 33, at 35.
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
Id.
48
See Kenneth J. Vandevelde, A Brief History of International Investment Agreements, 12 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L
L. & POL'Y 157 (2005).
43
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(1) Colonial Era

Before the Second World War, foreign direct investment protection did not receive
attention in international agreements.49 Most international investment treaties concerned
themselves with establishing trade relations; however, these treaties sometimes included
provisions regarding the protection of property for nationals of one party from the actions
of another country. 50 In other words, although there were treaties with international
investment protection, detailed provisions were not explained in the treaties.51

In the Colonial Era, the international investment regime had several
characteristics. 52 First, states negotiated both trade and property provisions in a single
agreement.53 Second, treaties played an important role in building commercial relations.54
Third, treaties were limited in scope and the afforded protections were weak, particularly
because the treaties provided no means for enforcement.55 Thus, it was possible that nonlegal methods, like military force or diplomacy, offered the principal means for foreign
investment protection.56

(2) The Post-Colonial Era

49

Id. at 158.
Id.
51
Id.
52
Id. at 161.
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
See Jeswald W. Salacuse & Nicholas P. Sullivan, Do BIT really work? An Evaluation of Bilateral
Investment Treaties and Their Grand Bargain, 46 HARV. INT'L L.J. 67, 68 (2005).
56
See Vandevelde, supra note 48, at 161.
50
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During this period, the content of international investment agreements possessed
other characteristics.57 First, as a “response to the severe economic depression that had
preceded the Second World War and been worsened by the protectionist policies of the
1920s,” 58 the victorious allies made it possible to reach a consensus regarding the
liberalization of trade.59 In 1947, “that consensus produced the signing of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which shifted the primary legal framework for
international trade relations from bilateral to multilateral agreements.”60 Bilateral trade
agreements began to decrease in importance, because the GATT became the main forum
for international trade negotiations.61 The second feature in this era was the decolonization
that began after the war and brought about the emergence of newly independent states. 62
However, these newly independent states were economically undeveloped countries. 63
Furthermore, these newly independent states were severely protective of their
independence and regarded foreign investment as a form of neocolonialism.64 The new
countries also feared that foreign investors would interfere with the host states’ domestic
affairs; the fear was that trade between developed and developing countries would result
in the exploitation of the developing countries. 65 As such, many developing countries
closed their economies to new foreign investment and began to expropriate existing
investment. 66 They also adopted import substitution policies; specifically, they would

57

Id.
See BERNARD HOEKMAN & MICHAEL KOSTECKI, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE WORLD TRADING
SYSTEM, 2-3 (1995).
59
See RONDO CAMERON, A CONCISE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE WORLD, 370-71 (1997).
60
See Vandevelde, supra note 48, at 161.
61
Id.
62
Id. at 166.
63
Id.
64
See DEAN HANINK, THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY: A GEOGRAPHIC PERSPECTIVE 234 (1994).
65
See BARRY W. POULSON, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: PRIVATE AND PUBLIC CHOICE 39 (1994).
66
See Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 55, at 75.
58
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prefer to produce needed goods and services locally rather than import them from
developed countries.67 The reason why these newly independent countries took a very
hostile position toward foreign investment was that they needed to preserve their wealth.68

Developed countries suggested an alternative to the problem of uncompensated
expropriation by creating the bilateral investment treaty (BIT). 69 “The United Nations’
Charter, adopted at the end of the war, prohibited the use of military force except in selfdefense, which rendered the use of force to collect debts or protect investment illegal under
international law.”70 Considering the severe weakness of customary international law as a
means of protecting international investment, BITs provided the most effective means for
preventing uncompensated expropriations.71
One of the BIT’s major innovations was its arbitration provision, in which the host
state consented to arbitration of certain disputes with investors.72 Also, the BITs did not
require investors to seek local remedies before going to international arbitration.73 BIT
provisions that provided investors with a legal remedy depoliticized investment disputes:74
in other words, BITs added investment protection as a new area of the law.75 For these
reasons, if there is an arbitration provision between investors and host countries’

67

See JOHN RAPLEY, UNDERSTANDING DEVELOPMENT: THEORY AND PRACTICE IN THE THIRD WORLD 22-25
(1996).
68
See Vandevelde, supra note 48, at 167.
69
See Jeswald W. Salacuse, BIT by BIT: The Growth of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Impact on
Foreign Investment in Developing Countries, 24 INT’L L. 655, 657 (1990).
70
See Vandevelde, supra note 48, at 169.
71
Id.
72
Treaty Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, U.S.-Alb., Jan. 11, 1995,
S. Treaty Doc. No. 104-19 (1995).
73
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Bilateral Investment Treaties, 177, U.N. Sales No.
E. 98. II.D.8 (1998).
74
See KENNETH J. VANDEVELDE, UNITED STATES INVESTMENT TREATIES: POLICY AND PRACTICE 22-25
(1992).
75
Id.
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governments in the BIT, this provision will allow the parties to resolve their investment
disputes using ICSID guidelines.76

(3) The Global Era

The global era reflects deep changes in the way international investment
agreements are negotiated, as international investors continue to move into developing
markets. 77 One of the most important changes in the past two decades has been the
intermingling of trade and investment provisions in international agreements.

78

Furthermore, a proliferation in the number of BITs has taken place in this Global Era. It is
likely that this proliferation demonstrates two major features.79 First, “the proliferation of
BITs represents a victory of market ideology”:80 “Several Asian countries had high rates
of private investment and production of goods for export about that of other developing
countries”;81 by signing more BITs, these Asian countries demonstrated confidence in the
constructive role that foreign investment and global integration can play in developing
economies.82 Second, there was a loss of alternatives to foreign investment as a source of
capital.83 For instance, “the 1980s’ debt crisis reduced the availability of private lending,
which accounted for half of all capital flows to developing countries by 1980.”84

76

Id.
See Kenneth J. Vandevelde, Sustainable Liberalism and the International Investment Regime, 19 MICH. J.
INT'L L. 373 (1998).
78
See Vandevelde, supra note 48, at 175.
79
Id.
80
Id. at 177.
81
Id.
82
See WORLD BANK, THE EAST ASIAN MIRACLE: ECONOMIC GROWTH AND PUBLIC POLICY 40-42 (1993).
83
See Vandevelde, supra note 48, at 177.
84
See Poulson, supra note 65, at 450-51.
77
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For both these reasons, developing countries started to abandon their hostility
towards foreign investment and sought ways to attract foreign investment by creating a
favorable international environment.85 Furthermore, developing countries made a more
proactive effort to attract foreign investment by guaranteeing their support of the market
economy and a secure investment environment.86 One mechanism that they used to create
a more secure investment environment involved concluding BITs that had provisions for
protection of foreign investment.87
Still, the Global Era’s BITs have changed little in nature since the Post-Colonial
Era:88 these more recent BITs still principally address the traditional investment protection
problems.89 “The U.S.’s BITs and a few others have incorporated some changes that were
largely in reaction to arbitral claims filed under the NAFTA investment chapter, but that
did not alter the basic nature of the treaty.” 90 These changes included the addition of
language specific to “the fair and equitable treatment standard” and that clarified the
expropriation provision.91 There were also changes modifying procedures for arbitrations
under the investor-state dispute resolution provision.92 As a result, BITs in the global era
have contained more than just investment promotion. Today, investment treaties not only
provide very important principles for foreign investors but also build a systematic structure
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for investment protection.93 As mentioned above, BITs have evolved through a process of
development for a long period of time.

At the same time, their advantages and

disadvantages have begun to become clear.

B. Advantages and Disadvantages of Investment Treaties

(1) Advantages of Investment Treaties

Investment treaties have some positive effects on foreign investments. The first
advantage of investment treaties is their promotion of investment:94 developed States are
inclined to promote investments “by inducing the developing host States to remove
obstacles in their regulatory systems.”95 Furthermore, if a developing State enacts a law
impeding the investment of a foreign investor, the foreign investor can file a lawsuit against
the host State for arbitration.96 Investment treaties seem to demand that the host State
create an investment environment that is helpful to foreign investors.97 When the investor
decides to invest, investment treaties have an effect on the investor’s decision; however, it
seems that government policies and national economic conditions play an even more
important role in the decision of the investor.98 “Thus, developed States tend to conclude
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investment treaties only with those developing States whose laws and policies offer
sufficient protection, and are favorable to, international investment.”99
Usually, investment treaties tend to guarantee investment protection: 100 this is
another advantage of investment treaties.101 “Investment treaties serve as a means through
which States establish mechanisms for protecting the foreign investments of their nationals
against the adverse actions of the host States’ government.”102 Developed countries utilize
investment treaties as a means to protect their property all over the world. 103 Moreover,
investment treaties enable the parties to use an international legal system, like
arbitration.104 This dispute resolution system gives the investor a chance to escape from
the uncertainty that arises when foreign investors rely on the domestic law of the host State,
which might not provide sufficient investment protection for them. 105 These broad
protections reduce the investor’s burden and allow the promotion of investment.106 As a
result, investment treaties have accelerated the promotion and protection of investments.

(2) Disadvantages of Investment Treaties

Despite the fact that investment treaties have some advantages, there are also
disadvantages concerning investment treaties. First, inequality in bargaining power exists
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between developed and developing States. 107

Economic inequality exists between

developed and developing States;108 thus, the claimed benefits resulting from investment
treaties are apt to lean in the direction of the developed States.109 Second, when it comes
to defending investment cases in arbitration, developing states are concerned about the high
expenses: 110 “investment treaties have been criticized on the ground of their cost
implications on the host States in defending claims brought about them by the foreign
investors.”111 Last, the international arbitration system created under investment treaties
gives a disadvantage to the host State.112 The host States are often developing States.113
Usually, these developing States’ economic and political situations are unstable;114 thus,
these situations trigger arbitration claims that might place the host State in trouble
economically and politically.115 Although investment treaties have some disadvantages,
many countries prefer concluding bilateral investment treaties, such as free trade
agreements. Interestingly, when two countries enter into BITs they tend to place investorState dispute settlement provisions into their BITs, and this phenomenon has been
increasing steadily despite the fact that the provisions of investor-State dispute settlement
are clearly unfavorable to developing countries.

4. Investor-State Dispute Settlement
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Usually, governments tend to encourage foreign and domestic investment to foster
their country’s economic growth;116 as such, the need for creating protections for foreign
investors against host governments arose. 117 One provision that can be included in
investment treaties to promote this protection is called an investor-State dispute settlement
(ISDS) system: under the ISDS system, foreign investors have the right to demand
international arbitration against a host State when they believe that the host State has not
observed an international investment treaty.118 However, the problem is that the current
system involving ISDS has been seriously criticized.119 As such, this paper examines the
flaws of the current ISDS system and how the KORUS FTA deals with ISDS provisions.

A. Structural Defects of ISDS

An ISDS arbitration proceeding inherently involves many structural defects, which
have a negative effect on the proceeding’s decisions. One of the serious problems involves
the lack of transparency in ISDS arbitration proceedings, due to the essentially secretive
nature of the arbitration process: 120 if both parties agree, ISDS provisions prohibit
documents related to their suit from being open to the public. 121 Disclosing these
documents to the public would improve the transparency of the proceedings and decrease
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corporate corruption.122 I think that guaranteeing the transparency of the ISDS system
could prevent host States’ policy constraints and increase foreign investors’ legitimate
expectations. The second issue is the cost of ISDS arbitration. 123 “The rules of cost
allocation among parties are very flexible and can create uncertainty for both claimants and
respondents”; 124 as a result, the financially stronger party will gain an advantage in
ISDS.125 I think that countries, and foreign investors who do not have sufficient capital,
might face a considerable economic burden in arbitration. Third, “under the ICSID and
UNCITRAL rules, ISDS arbitrators are selected on a case-by-case basis”126—“if the parties
do not agree on another method, each party may appoint one arbitrator, and those two
chosen arbitrators appoint a third arbitrator.” 127 The current ISDS system results in
conflicts of both parties’ interests and concerns that the arbitrators are unfair.128 Fourth,
the appointed arbitrators have a great deal of flexibility to interpret and apply investment
treaties;129 as such, inconsistent interpretations regarding the meaning of important treaty
provisions have resulted in uncertainty. 130 This lack of consistency in ISDS decisions
results in future cases having unforeseeable decisions.131 Finally, a persistent criticism of
the international investment arbitration process is that ISDS is likely to come to the wrong
holding, but an appellate procedure does not exist to serve as a corrective mechanism.132
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The absence of an appellate mechanism decreases ISDS’s transparency and predictability
for host States and investors.133 The ISDS system fundamentally includes many structural
problems, but nevertheless, many U.S. FTAs including the KORUS FTA have ISDS
provisions.

B. ISDS in the KORUS FTA

The U.S. Congress approved the U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA)
on October 12, 2011, and South Korea’s National Assembly approved it on November 22,
2011.134 The FTA took effect in March 2012.135 “The United States and South Korea
entered into the KORUS FTA to reinforce their economic relationship by reducing barriers
to trade and investment”;136 as trade and business transactions between the United States
and South Korea flourish, U.S. investors are taking an interest in the investment
environment within South Korea.137 In the KORUS FTA, “the U.S. government seeks to
reinforce protections for U.S. investors through various rules on expropriation,
performance requirements, transparency, and non-discriminatory national treatment
standards - these serve to protect investment profits against potential political
disturbance.”138 “To resolve investor disputes, the United States and South Korea agreed
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to provide for investor-state dispute settlement.”139 This mechanism allows U.S. or Korean
investors to seek arbitration directly against a host state’s government.140

There are several political reasons why the United States and South Korea agreed
to have provisions for investor-State dispute settlement. Managing a strong diplomatic
relationship is very important to both the United States and South Korea:141 the KORUS
FTA has a great purpose in both reinforcing the business relationship and fostering a
partnership between the two countries. 142 On the other hand, a friendly diplomatic
relationship between the two countries includes greater risk: 143 the KORUS FTA will
contribute to considerable investment promotion in both countries, and this investment
facilitation will bring about investment-related disputes.144 When deciding what type of
investor-State dispute settlement should be included in the KORUS FTA, the United States
and South Korea agreed to decrease any risks that might affect the diplomatic relationship
between the two countries.145 “Investor-State dispute settlement provisions are less of a
diplomatic risk than state-to-state dispute settlement provisions”: 146 in State-to-State
dispute settlement, if investors have used up domestic remedies provided by the host
State’s courts, the investors can require their home State to bring a claim against the host
State.147 In this regard, “a state fundamentally changes a private claim into a diplomatic
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dispute” 148 —if the KORUS FTA included state-to-state dispute settlement provisions,
diplomatic disputes would occur and would weaken the relationship between the U.S. and
South Korea. 149 Contrary to this, investor-State dispute settlements undermine the
importance of investors’ home States.150 In other words, investors can file a suit against
the host State directly. Furthermore, investor-State dispute settlement is less politically
sensitive:151 an investor can file a suit against a host State without the help of his home
state government;152 as a result, the investor’s home state can keep a good relationship with
the host State during disputes. 153

However, the provision for ISDS is inherently

unfavorable to South Korea, because South Korea’s economic and political situations are
highly unstable: these unpredictable situations could result in U.S. investors making claims
through the ISDS provisions in the KORUS FTA.
According to the KORUS FTA’s investment Chapter, “the KORUS FTA does not
allow the Parties to expropriate or nationalize covered investments, whether directly or
indirectly, through measures equivalent to expropriation or nationalization unless: it is for
a public purpose; done in a non-discriminatory manner; provides payment of prompt,
adequate, and effective compensation; and is executed in accordance with due process of
law.” 154 In particular, within the Annex on Expropriation, there is a provision that
maintains “non-discriminatory regulatory actions by a Party that are designed and applied
to protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such as public health, safety, and the
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environment, except in rare circumstances, do not constitute indirect expropriations.”155
According to Korean Constitutional law, all citizens have the right to a healthy and pleasant
environment; 156 as such, the State and all citizens shall endeavor to protect the
environment. 157 However, when a U.S. investor brings a claim against the Korean
government to an arbitration tribunal, “the tribunal shall decide the issues in dispute in
accordance with provisions of the KORUS FTA and applicable rules of international
law.”158 As a result, despite the fact that the KORUS FTA lies hierarchically under Korean
Constitutional law, one predictable outcome of the ISDS provisions is that U.S. investors
might challenge South Korea’s environmental laws and policies. Although the KORUS
FTA protects a government’s right to maintain measures that guarantee investment
activities and that protect legitimate public welfare objectives, including the environment,
the investor-State dispute settlement provision enables investors to seek compensation for
environmental laws and policies contrary to their interests.159 Therefore, there remains a
question of how to balance both investors’ interests and state measures regarding subjects
such as environmental policy.

5. Conclusion

This Chapter discussed three major issues. First, based upon the analysis above,
when it comes to the relationship between domestic law and international law, the Korean
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legal system permits treaties to automatically affect domestic laws. Thus, the KORUS
FTA has the same hierarchical position as Korean legislation; in other words, it is
hierarchically beneath Korean Constitutional law. As such, provisions providing for
investor-State dispute settlement in the KORUS FTA pose a possible threat to Korean
Constitutional law and policy, because in the event that a U.S. investor files a suit against
the Korean government to the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes
(ICSID), the Tribunal can deal with the dispute according to the provisions of the KORUS
FTA and international law. For this reason, the Tribunal decision could paralyze South
Korea’s law and environmental policy. Second, concerning foreign investors’ rights and
States’ regulatory sovereignty, international investment treaties provide protection for
foreign investors against regulatory risks from the State. However, they also include
provisions for the protection of public interests, such as resolving health and environmental
problems. As a result, a tension between both interests naturally arises and international
investment treaties try to find ways to balance between the two important interests. Third
and last, this Chapter analyzed the current ISDS system. The current ISDS system greatly
disadvantages countries whose political and economic statuses are unstable. Indeed, this
unsteady situation within developing countries is highly likely to bring about arbitration
claims at foreign investors’ requests. Furthermore, the current ISDS system inherently has
many structural problems that can trigger constraints on a host State’s regulatory space.
Therefore, this Chapter ultimately poses the question of how to balance both foreign
investors’ interests and State measures.
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CHAPTER II. ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY & CRITICISM OF KOREA’S
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY

1. Introduction

The aim of this Chapter is to explain how countries make an effort to resolve
environmental problems and issues, including how awareness of the need for
environmental protection is increased. Furthermore, this Chapter examines the elements
needed to produce good policy design. Next there is an explanation concerning why, when
the need for environmental regulations changes, environmental regulations change and
foreign investors’ predictability is therefore reduced. This Chapter ends by analyzing the
environmental chapter of the KORUS FTA and describing Korea’s current environmental
policy problems.

2. Environmental Law and Policy

A. Background

As time has passed, our environmental law and policy have become increasingly
important.
revolution,

Most environmental legislation systems appeared after the industrial
160

when rapid urbanization brought about various new environmental

problems. 161 Therefore significant institutions, such as environmental ministries and
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national agencies, were empowered to develop the new laws. 162 For example, “states
imposed restrictions on land use and private and public activities to protect endangered
species and try to control waste and chemical diffusion.”163 On the other hand, several
developing countries still do not realize the importance of environmental problems and
their essential environmental institutions are not functioning well.164

Though modern environmental law has dealt with local environmental problems—
such as air pollution, waste disposal, and pest control—global environmental issues and
concerns, such as global warming and climate change, have started appearing since the
1980s and 1990s.165 Furthermore, transnational actors such as multinational corporations
(MNCs) are leading the global economy, and they are exercising broad influence all over
the world.166 Thus, environmental issues became part of global issues, and environmental
problems have had a serious negative impact on people who live around the world; as such,
organizations of governments and individuals are making an effort to decrease
environmental problems.

B. Developing Countries’ Environmental Law

Most developing countries comparatively lack an understanding of environmental
protection, compared to developed countries.
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However, developing countries’

environmental laws and policies share general characteristics.167 First, developing states
rely more on foreign investments to obtain economic benefits than do developed states.168
Furthermore, the people who live in developing countries are especially vulnerable to
environmental damage: 169 this is because “developing states have many structural
drawbacks about environmental administration, such as inexperienced and underpaid staff,
often under the jurisdiction of different authorities, and risk of corruption.”170 Developing
states’ environmental authorities lack the budget and skill to monitor their environmental
quality,171 and it is uncommon for NGOs, foreign institutions, or international associations
to monitor the quality of the environment.172 Moreover, developing countries tend to be
less interested in environmental problems due to their lack of environmental knowledge
and low living standards:173 “those weaknesses may contribute to the favoring of direct
regulations, plain prohibitions, and sanctions, instead of administratively complex systems
like cap-and-trade systems.”174 To reduce the difference between developed countries and
developing countries, global institutions such as the World Commission on Environment
and Development work to find new ideas to protect the environment.

C. Sustainable Development
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Many countries all over the world pursued economic development after the Second
World War. 175 To decrease poverty in the developing countries and improve living
standards around the world, economic development has been regarded as an important
factor.176 During this time, many international institutions and developed countries have
assisted developing countries in building basic infrastructure for economic growth and
environmental protection. 177 Simultaneously, most developed countries have aimed at
sustaining economic growth as their priority. 178 However, economic development and
environmental sustainability cannot synergize well with each other during the same
period.179 For this reason, the idea of sustainable development has become increasingly
important to the world, and many countries’ environmental laws and policies are dealing
with this idea as a fundamental principle.

The concept of sustainable development started to receive notice after policy
makers became interested in the publication of Our Common Future, which is reported by
the World Commission on Environment and Development.180

Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own
needs. It contains within it two key concepts: the concept of “needs,” in
particular the essential needs of the world’s poor, to which overriding
priority should be given; and the idea of limitations imposed by the state of
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technology and social organization on the environment’s ability to meet
present and future needs.181
The purpose of sustainable development includes three important challenges. 182
First, attempting to limit the scale of human activity’s effects on the biosphere.183 Second,
attempting to fairly distribute the benefits of human activity to all.184 The third and final
challenge for sustainable development involves finding an efficient allocation for our finite
resources.185 Advanced environmental policies enable not only stopping degradation but
also helping to foster sustainable development.186 In this regard, the idea of sustainable
development has become one of the most important elements when policy makers create
their country’s environmental policies.

D. Environmental Policy Design

The Purpose of environmental policy is to find ways to reduce the negative impact
of humanity upon the environment.187 Policy makers use different policy approaches and
instruments.

188

This dissertation introduces a basic approach and corresponding

instruments for a good policy design: a good environmental policy design commonly
includes elements promoting effectiveness, efficiency, and fairness.189 To properly satisfy

181

See WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENTAL AND DEVELOPMENT, OUR COMMON FUTURE 43 (1987).
Id. at 151.
183
Id.
184
Id.
185
Id.
186
Id. at 23.
187
See Hunter, supra note 175, at 434.
188
Id.
189
See Romson, supra note 160, at 119.
182

38

a nation’s environmental goals, Sterner190 explains the important elements for good policy
design as follows:

Cost-effectiveness: if the instrument operates as planned, it would achieve
the environmental goals at the lowest cost; Effectiveness: a more ambitious
concept including the optimality of the goal, that is, the level of abatement
or of resource stock; Sustainability: long-term feasibility and fairness;
Incentive compatibility: the agents involved (particularly the polluters, but
also regulators, victims, and others) have an incentive to provide
information and undertake abatement and so on; Distributional and equity
concerns: the distribution of costs or responsibilities should be seen as fair;
and Administrative feasibility: the avoiding of excessive financial or
informational costs for the operation of the instrument191

To improve the health and safety of citizens, every country creates its own
environmental policy.

As described above, there are essential elements, such as

sustainability and transparency, which are necessary for creating good policymaking.
Through the harmonization of these crucial elements, more desirable and reasonable
environmental policies could be created. To this end, many countries, including developed
and developing countries, are introducing the idea of sustainable development through their
environmental policies, and they are continuously seeking to balance between economic
development and environmental protection.

E. Environmental Law: Regulatory Stability and Predictability for Foreign Investors
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When investors decide to invest in foreign countries, a secure investment
environment and regulations’ predictability are significant factors for the investors. 192
However, the government’s regulations are likely to change constantly. When better ways
to protect the environment—or prevent human behaviors from harming the environment—
are created, new standards to preserve the environment can be applied.193 Several elements
have an effect on the changing of environmental regulations:194 specifically, changes to
environmental quality and the development of new technology to resolve environmental
problems give rise to changing environmental regulations.195 For instance, if a country’s
general acceptance about an environmental problem changes, or new scientific knowledge
appears, their environmental regulations would be altered. 196 Usually, environmental
regulations provide reasonable regulatory stability for foreign investors. 197 However,
changes in environmental regulations could have a negative effect on foreign investors’
predictability. For this reason, an environmental regulation needs to balance between the
need for the rules’ change and the need for foreign investors’ predictability. 198 If changes
in environmental regulations appear within an expected time and improve transparency,
they would not greatly affect foreign investors’ predictability.199
This relationship between environmental regulations and foreign investors’
legitimate expectations is explained well in the Vattenfall v. Germany case. After a nuclear
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disaster in Fukushima, Japan in 2011, the German congress decided to phase out its nuclear
power plants and immediately shut down some of the oldest nuclear power plants that
Vattenfall, a Swedish energy company, operated.200 Vattenfall brought a claim against
Germany not only to the ICSID but also to the German Constitutional Court.201 The GCC
concentrated its analysis on whether Vatenfall should be compensated according to
German Constitutional law. 202 They explained that the State could freely change its
regulations to protect public interests, such as public health and the environment. 203
However, they stated that a State should change its regulations reasonably and foreseeably.
In other words, that the State should protect foreign investors’ legitimate expectations.
Furthermore, the GCC reviewed issues concerning private property rights, expropriation,
and compensation.204 They found that if a State changes its policy, leading to foreign
investors’ economic loss, then the State should adequately compensate for the investors’
economic loss.205 In this case, the GCC found that Germany’s completely altered policy
regarding their nuclear power plants violated Vattenfall’s property rights. 206 Thus,
Germany had to compensate for Vattenfall’s economic loss.207 I predict that this case,
involving Vattenfall’s claim against Germany, might have an effect on future decisions of
the ICSID.
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3. Criticism of Korea’s Environmental Policy

Korea has been reinforcing the implementation of its environmental policies.208
Most of the environmental policies in Korea pursue a harmonization between economic
growth and environmental protection.209 Environmental non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) not only actively attend to environmental issues but also make an effort to address
environmental problems.210 The business and industry sectors voluntarily participate in
the environmental campaign and observe the environmental policies laid forth by the
Korean government.211 Furthermore, by introducing a monitoring system, the government
continuously tracks environmental issues.212 Additionally, improved property rights and a
more efficient legal system make it possible to improve the economy’s quality.213 A stable
microeconomic environment and sound infrastructure have had positive effects on Korea’s
economic growth. 214 However, South Korea’s rapid economic development, energy
intensive industrial expansion, and extremely high population density have still brought
severe environmental problems; accordingly, South Korea is attempting the transition to a
low-carbon economy, as clean energy investment and regulations designed to solve
environmental problems have become increasingly popular throughout the world’s
strongest economies.
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A. Korea’s Environmental Policy

There are vivid examples of South Korea’s environmental policy instability, lack
of national consensus, and political corruption. These factors decrease the transparency of
the government’s policymaking and also decrease regulatory stability and predictability for
foreign investors.

1) Korea’s Green Growth Policy

South Korea has appeared as the leader of the “Green Growth” concept, which
pursues harmonization between environmental protection and economic development.215
The Lee Myung-bak Administration of South Korea introduced the “Low Carbon, Green
Growth” policy;216 the goal of Green Growth is to simultaneously pursue goals related to
economic growth and environmental protection.217 In other words, “Green Growth seeks
to advance the transition from quantitative growth to qualitative growth and the shift from
the traditional, fossil-fuel dependent socioeconomic structure into a law carbon one.”218

The purpose behind this definition is to clarify that South Korea continuously
pursues economic growth,219 but green growth in South Korea deals not only with climate
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change mitigation but also with a reduction in fossil fuel use.220 Indeed, “it penetrated most
aspects of South Korean society, including both public and private industrial sectors, the
transportation and building sectors, and the lifestyle and consumption of individuals.”221
On the other hand, the Park Guen-hye Administration of South Korea condemned the
“Green Growth” concept for not having a clear conceptual vision and purpose, because
they viewed the policy as being excessively tilted towards economic growth.222 They also
criticized the “Green Growth” concept’s pursuit of sustainable development; however, it
does not clearly explain social equity, which is one of the important principles behind
sustainable development. 223 As a result, under the Park Guen-hye Administration, the
previous Administration’s environmental policy has not been vigorously enforced. This
policy inconsistency has an effect on foreign investors’ legitimate expectations.

2) Korea’s Carbon Emissions Trading System

The Korean business world is aggressively combatting the government’s plan to
institute a carbon-emission trading system starting from last year. “The carbon-emission
trading system aims to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by setting a quantitative limit on
CO2 emissions and by allowing participants to trade insufficient or surplus amounts of CO2
emissions with each other.”224 The South Korean government has announced a 2030 target
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for reducing greenhouse gas emissions by thirty-seven percent from “BAU”225 (Business
As Usual).226 The industrial sector’s criticism emphasizes that the government has handled
this new climate change system without careful examination. 227 They are implacably
opposed to the government’s unilateral policy of enforcement and state that this does not
reflect Korea’s industrial reality.228 Many economic experts and business owners oppose
the government’s plan, because the carbon-emissions trading system will raise the cost of
power generation, which could also hike electricity bills.229 Another issue regarding the
new policy is that it places the same burden on companies that have been attentive in
making early reductions to their greenhouse gas emissions. 230 Furthermore, the ecofriendly system that has already been built could be damaged because of the government’s
requirement for uniform upper limits.231

3) Korea’s Carbon Tax Policy

The carbon tax policy is also an example of unrealistic environmental policies. The
carbon tax policy is designed to create a clean environment by subsidizing consumers who
buy a car with low carbon emissions and taxing those who purchase a car with high
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emissions. 232 The Korean government is planning to implement its carbon tax policy
beginning last year; on the other hand, Korea will postpone introduction of a vehicle carbon
emission tax until 2020.233 According to the Korea Economic Research Institute (KERI),
this carbon tax policy is not plausible because those who buy imported cars would face a
lesser burden compared to domestic car buyers, due to the price difference between
domestic cars and imports. 234 Furthermore, KERI questioned whether the carbon tax
system would improve the environment, because there is no evidence that a carbon tax
policy would have a positive effect on environmental improvement.235

4) Korea’s Fine Dust Particles

Fine dust particles are worsening Korea’s air quality every year; as a result, fine
dust particles have become a serious social and environmental problem in Korea. Although
fine dust particles originate in China, car emissions and coal-fired power plants are the
primary ways that the fine dust particles are produced.236 According to the Financial Times,
“power from coal-fired plants in Korea increased by whopping 95 percent last year from
2005.”237 Furthermore, the OECD gave a severe warning that Korea’s air pollution will
result in Korea having the highest rates of premature death within the OECD member
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countries by 2060.238 The Korean government will gradually shut down old coal-fired
power plants that have been operating over thirty years.239 However, it is also planning to
build nine new coal-fired power plants.240
I would like to criticize the Korean government’s attitude and inconsistent policy
regarding coal-fired power plants. The ministry of Environment said that “62 to 80 percent
of the fine dust and 84 to 86 percent of the ultra-fine particles polluting air around the
capital came from overseas.”241 On the other hand, “the Financial Times quoted Kim Shindo, professor at the University of Seoul, as saying that just 20 percent of fine dust come
from China.”242 As a result, it is difficult to trust the announcement regarding fine dust
particles by the Korean government. In addition, to decrease fine dust particles, other
countries such as Norway are encouraging the use of electric vehicles and LPG fuel
vehicles.243 Yet, “Korean laws restrict personal use of LPG vehicles because of unstable
LPG fuel supply and reduction of tax revenues.”244 For this reason, car buyers prefer to
buy diesel vehicles, which have relatively high efficiency and low fuel prices.245 I predict
that this restriction on the personal use of LPG fuel vehicles might be changed to further
reduce the production of fine dust particles. Ultimately, environmental protection policies
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include long-term uncertainty and regulatory risks; certainly, factors such as policy
inconsistency and opacity might interfere with foreign investors’ legitimate expectations.

5) Korea’s Political Corruption

A serious and awful political scandal related to the current president recently took
place in South Korea.246 “South Korea lawmakers had voted to impeach President Park
Geun-hye for her role in a corruption scandal that has paralyzed the country for two
months.”247 Subsequently, last March, all eight justices on the Korean Constitutional Court
unanimously upheld the impeachment motion based on the President’s role in
corruption.248 “The justices said the president had continuously violated Korean law and
Constitution.”249 The majority of the people agreed with the impeachment,250 “but it does
not solve South Korea’s endemic corruption problem.” 251 The problem is that the big
corporations in South Korea, such as Samsung, are related to chronic corruption:252 these
huge corporations assist the government and gain benefits from it.253 This relationship
between politicians and business has proven to have a substantial negative effect on Korean
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society.254 As a result, South Korea’s political corruption could reduce the transparency of
the government’s policymaking processes.

4. The Environment Chapter of the KORUS FTA

Korea’s policies do not, however, act in isolation. They are subject to, and
influenced by, numerous obligations that the Korean government has undertaken—the
most relevant obligation for this dissertation being the KORUS FTA. The KORUS FTA
has a number of elements related to environmental protection that are worth a brief
discussion.

A. Level of Protection

The Environmental Chapter of the KORUS FTA recognizes “the right of each Party
to determine its own level of environmental protection; however, it requires both Korea
and the U.S. to provide and encourage a high level of environmental protection.”255 In
addition, “both Parties should continue to improve their respective levels of environmental
protection by applying their own environmental laws and policies.”256

B. Environmental Agreements
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“The Environment Chapter within the KORUS FTA requires each Party to adopt,
maintain, and implement laws, and all other measures necessary, in order to fulfill its
obligations under the seven ‘multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs)’”; 257 “these
are CITES (the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species), the Montreal
Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, the Convention on Wetlands
(Ramsar), the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution From Ships (Marpol
73/78), the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources
(CCAMILR), the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, and the
Convention for the Establishment of an Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission
(IATTC).”258 Korea and the U.S. both agree that MEAs are important tools for protecting
the environment, domestically and internationally.

C. Application and Enforcement of Environmental Laws

When problems involving the application and enforcement of environmental laws
occur, Article 20.3 of the Environment Chapter explains how each Party must observe their
obligations. According to Article 20.3(a): (i) “neither party shall fail to effectively enforce
its environmental laws, and other measures to fulfill its obligations under the covered
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agreements”; (ii) “through a sustainable or recurring course of action or inaction”; (iii) “in
a manner affecting trade or investment between the Parties.”259 The KORUS FTA does
not allow the Parties to waive or derogate their environmental laws.260

D. Environmental Cooperation

Today, we are faced with a complicated and wide variety of environmental
problems that countries all over the world should resolve. However, every country in the
world is not confronted with the same circumstances, and each alone does not possess the
solutions to resolve these environmental issues and problems by itself. For this reason,
through the Environment Chapter of the KORUS FTA, Korea and the U.S. both strive to
find effective ways for environmental protection by cooperating and sharing useful
information with each other. 261 Both Parties agree that expanding their interactive
connection in various ways will help them accomplish their environmental goals and
objectives, such as the development and improvement of environmental protection.262 In
the Environment Chapter, the agreement between the Government of the United States of
America and the Government of the Republic of Korea on Environmental Cooperation
(ECA) “is coordinated and reviewed by the implementation body established under the
ECA” and will help them further the environmental activities of each other.263
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E. Public Participation

In order to successfully implement the Environment Chapter, the KORUS FTA
emphasizes the importance of public participation. Growing public concerns about
environmental issues and problems, and awareness of environmental protection, have
increased the importance of public participation. Under the KORUS FTA, any citizen of
a Party may file a submission with their concerns regarding the implementation of any
provisions within the chapter. 264 “Each Party will respond to these submissions in a
manner consistent with its own domestic procedures.”265

F. Environmental Affairs Council

The KORUS FTA establishes an Environmental Affairs Council to oversee the
implementation of the Environmental Chapter. The council is composed of advanced
government officials from each Party and meets once per year. 266 The Environmental
Affairs Council is responsible for addressing environmental issues first; if EAC does not
deal with them, then the Joint Committee, which is responsible for the administration of
the KORUS FTA, discusses the environmental issues.267 The KORUS FTA requires the
Council to promote public participation, not only by seeking advice from the public in
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developing agendas for Council meetings, but also by sharing information with the public
regarding environmental issues. 268 In this respect, the Council should give the public
proper opportunities to engage in cooperative environmental activities.269

5. Conclusion

New concerns about environmental quality, and the development of new
technology, bring changes to environmental regulations. These changes to environmental
regulations affect foreign investors’ predictability. If changes to environmental regulations
occur rapidly or suddenly, foreign investors’ predictions about regulatory stability will
become murky.

In contrast, if changes to environmental regulations occur over a

reasonable time and involve enhancing transparency, foreign investors’ predictability will
be guaranteed. Thus, when a State changes its environmental regulations, it should consider
balancing between the need for the rules’ change and the need for foreign investors’
predictability.
According to the environmental chapter of the KORUS FTA, “the United States
and Korea should continue to improve their respective levels of environmental protection
by applying their own environmental laws and policies.”270 Furthermore, as mentioned
previously, various elements such as sustainability, transparency, and public participation
are needed to make a good policy. However, Korea’s environmental policy has many
problems.

268

KORUS FTA Article 20.6 (3).
KORUS FTA Article 20.6 (4).
270
KORUS FTA Article 20.1.
269

53

Korea is the eleventh largest economy in the world.271 On the other hand, one of
South Korea’s greatest problems is the government’s inconsistent environmental policies
and unilateral policy enforcement. According to the World Economic Forum, South
Korea’s ranking for policy instability, transparency of government policymaking, and
burden of government regulation is low.272 More specifically, “policy instability remains
a concern for doing business and is ranked as the most problematic factor in this respect.”273
Furthermore, “South Korea ranking on Transparency International Corruption Perceptions
Index is very poor.”274

From my perspective, political factors have had a harmful influence on
environmental policy in South Korea. Whenever a new administration begins, the previous
administration’s environmental policy is abolished or postponed. As such, the problem is
that South Korea’s environmental policy is short on policy consistency. Moreover, policy
makers do not pay attention to public opinion; for this reason, the Korean government’s
unilateral policy-making triggers a lack of national consensus and public participation.
Political corruption also takes place very often in South Korea. According to David C.
Nice, “political corruption reduces public confidence in government action and public
willingness to trust government agencies with substantial authority or funding.” 275 These
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are all elements that can negatively affect regulatory stability and predictability for foreign
investors.
In other words, as mentioned previously, the Korean government’s regulatory
actions to protect public interests are likely to amount to “except in rare circumstance.”
Under the KORUS FTA, “non-discriminatory regulatory actions by a Party that are
designed and applied to protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such as public health,
safety, and the environment, except in rare circumstances, do not constitute indirect
expropriations.”276 The effect of the governmental action on investment is the greatest
factor in assessing whether or not there has been an indirect expropriation: 277 as a result,
some of South Korea’s environmental measures might adversely affect the interests of a
foreign investor. For all these reasons, there is the possibility that foreign investors will
file actions against South Korea for interfering with their property rights; and that they will
seek international arbitration, because the Korean government’s action amounted to an
indirect expropriation.
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CHAPTER

III.

ENVIRONMENTAL

REGULATIONS

AND

INDIRECT

EXPROPRIATION & FAIR AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT

1. Introduction

The purpose of this Chapter is to explain the types of governmental measures that
could amount to an indirect expropriation, examine the essential elements necessary for a
finding of compensable indirect expropriation, and analyze a conflict between the fair and
equitable treatment standard (FET) and changes to environmental regulations or permits.
This Chapter first discusses the relationship between environmental regulations or permits
and indirect expropriation, with the second part of the Chapter examining how
environmental regulations affect the FET. The Chapter analyzes in considerable detail how
changes to environmental regulations can have an effect on foreign investors’ legitimate
expectations, playing an important role in the interpretation of the FET and in ultimately
coming to a determination of indirect expropriation. This Chapter draws its conclusions
through the analysis of many investment arbitration cases.

2. Environmental Regulations and Indirect Expropriation

Direct expropriation carries significant dangers, because it often acts to destroy
foreign direct investment, which harms the countries’ investment climate.278 Additionally,
countries are worried that such expropriation might trigger a reduction in the influx of
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foreign capital.279 For these reasons, by the early twenty-first century direct expropriation
had not occurred often,

280

while cases alleging indirect expropriations are more

common.281 An indirect expropriation means that states do not touch an investor’s title
directly, but they either impede an investor’s ability or reduce the benefit from an
investment considerably. 282

Usually, in an indirect expropriation, States deny an

expropriation’s existence and justify their actions as a legitimate regulatory exercise. 283
To determine whether a States’ regulatory action constitutes an indirect
expropriation, the 2004 US Model Treaty explains the issue more specifically. After
stating in Article 6(1) that “neither Party may expropriate or nationalize a covered
investment either directly or indirectly through measures equivalent to expropriation or
nationalization,”284 a special Annex B named “Expropriation” adds:

(a) The determination of whether an action or series of actions by a Party,
in a specific situation, constitutes an indirect expropriation, requires a
case-by-case, fact-based inquiry that considers, among other factors: (i)
the economic impact of the government action, although the fact that an
action or series of actions by a Party has an adverse effect on the
economic value of an investment, standing alone, does not establish that
an indirect expropriation has occurred; (ii) the extent to which the
government action interferes with distinct, reasonable investmentbacked expectations; and (iii) the character of the government action.285
279
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(b) Except in rare circumstances, non-discriminatory regulatory actions by
a Party that are designed and applied to protect legitimate public welfare
objectives, such as public health, safety, and the environment, do not
constitute indirect expropriations.286

This means that when a State’s actions are applied to reasonably protect the public
welfare, they are not considered an indirect expropriation. While the 2004 US Model
Treaty includes an exception for “except in rare circumstances,”287 “it does not totally
exclude situations where public regulation gives rise to indirect expropriation.” 288 The
KORUS FTA also includes this language. According to the KORUS FTA, “the
agreement’s expropriation provisions have been clarified in two annexes to ensure that they
are consistent with U.S. legal principles and practice, including a clarification that nondiscriminatory regulatory actions designed and applied to protect the public welfare do not
constitute indirect expropriation ‘except in rare circumstances.’”289 On the other hand, the
problem is that we have no way of knowing the scope of the rare circumstances, nor the
exact meaning of the phrase.

A. Types of Governmental Policies and Indirect Expropriation

Various types of governmental measures have an effect on the investment of a
foreign investor.

According to arbitral tribunals, the following four types of host
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government measures, discussed in their own subsections, are considered to be indirect
expropriations: (1) change in government permits or licenses; (2) disproportionate tax
increases; (3) interference with contractual rights; and (4) unjustified interference with the
management of the investment.290

(1) Change in Government Permits or Licenses

Although the investor possesses full title and control over the investment, in certain
situations the revocation or denial of permits by the government amount to an indirect
expropriation.291 For example, in the case of TECMED v Mexico, the Claimant claimed
that Mexican authorities modified the investment regarding a landfill after the investment
was made.292 TECMED had requested that INE (the Environmental Protection Agency)
renew a permit to operate their landfill. 293 However, INE denied TECMED’s request
because TECMED breached some terms of the permit and applicable regulations.294 The
INE ordered closure of the landfill, because the wastes in the landfill exceeded the limits
that the permit allowed. 295 Those violations triggered community groups to oppose
continued operation of the landfill and civil society groups demanded the landfill’s
closure.296 The landfill was located near the city of Hermosillo; and, according to the
Claimant, the new authorities of Hermosillo supported their citizens in opposing the
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landfill’s operation and requiring its closure. 297 The Claimants also argued, first, that
political circumstances affected the INE’s refusal to renew the license and, second, that
INE’s action in refusing to extend the authorization to operate the landfill was considerably
subjective.298

The Respondent said that such a refusal was not a result of an arbitrary action but
was a control measure—related to public interests.299 The Respondent pointed out that the
community group’s negative attitude against the landfill was based, not only on its location,
but also on the community group’s highly critical view regarding hazardous toxic waste.300
The Respondent alleged, the “Resolution was a regulatory measure issued in compliance
with the State’s police power within the highly regulated and extremely sensitive
framework of environmental protection and public health.”301 Therefore, the Respondent
concluded that the Resolution was a reasonable action of the state and did not amount to
an expropriation.302

On the other hand, the Claimant stated that denying the renewal of the permit was
not reasonable, because it had operated the landfill for the previous year without any
problem.303 The Tribunal concluded that the facts of the case indicated that TECMED’s
breaches of the Permit’s terms and environmental regulations were minor and did not
“compromise public health, impair ecological balance or protection of the environment.”304
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The Tribunal also considered whether public opposition to the landfill had generated “a
genuine social crisis” or “public emergency” justifying non-renewal of the permit. 305
Having analyzed the circumstances surrounding the revocation of the landfill permit, the
tribunal found that the situation contained no emergency circumstances, serious social
situation, or even any urgency.306 Therefore, it determined that the measures undertaken
by the Mexican authorities were not proportional to the aim sought and were therefore
equivalent to an expropriation.307

(2) Unfair Tax

To limit the activities of foreign investors and investments, host countries can levy
taxes on investors.308 An example is in Occidental Exploration and Production Company
v The Republic of Ecuador, where the claimant alleged an indirect expropriation through
taxation.309 According to the facts of this dispute, during the 1980s and 1990s OEPC
provided oil production services to Petroecuador, an Ecuadorian State-owned corporation
responsible for the planning, organization, and operation of hydrocarbon exploration and
exploitation activities in Ecuador. 310 OEPC produced local products in Ecuador and
imported goods in connection with the production of oil;311 OEPC paid VAT on these local
and imported products.312 Eventually, OEPC applied to the Ecuadorian Internal Revenue
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Service for the refund of VAT payments.313 At first repayments were made; however, the
SRI passed Resolution 664, which denied the claims of OEPC for VAT tax credits and
reimbursements.314

The Claimants believed that they had the right to value-added tax (VAT) refunds
under Ecuador’s tax system at the time of investment.315 The Claimant alleged that by
“unlawfully, arbitrarily, discriminatorily, and retroactively taking OEPC’s right to VAT
refunds, Ecuador has expropriated all or part of investment by OEPC.” 316 However, “the
Tribunal held that the measures did not affect a substantial portion and reasonable
economic benefit of the investment.”317

(3) Changes to Existing Contractual Rights

“Many governmental actions can have a negative effect on an investor’s contractual
rights.”318 “International law protects contract rights from expropriation, and investment
treaties have sought to broaden and deepen that protection significantly.”319 Based on such
treaty provisions, investors can allege that government measures affected their contractual
rights as if they constituted expropriation. 320 An example occurred in CME v. Czech
Republic, where the investor complained that a government-established regulatory
authority, the Media Council, interrupted their contractual rights and that such interference
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weakened the guaranteed license of the investor’s local partner.321 The tribunal found that
“the regulatory authority had breached the Netherland-Czech Republic BIT’s provision
against indirect expropriation on the grounds that the Czech Republic forced the investor
to accept the amendments to the contract.”322 Consequently, this act infringed on CME’s
legal security.323

(4) Unjustified Interference with the Investment

Finally, an indirect expropriation might occur when governmental measures
considerably or completely interfere with an investor’s control over an investment. 324
“This can occur when an investor is physically or legally impeded from its management
tasks or when investor-controlled management is replaced with government-appointed
management.”325 To assess the extent to which such interference constitutes an indirect
expropriation, the important element is the degree of the interference. 326 An example
occurred in Biloune v. Ghana, when the investment project to build a restaurant complex
through the investor’s local subsidiary, MDCL, was impeded.327 When local governmental
authorities ordered MDCL to stop the project, it was already substantially underway.328
The tribunal stated, “given the central role of Mr. Biloune in promoting, financing, and
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managing MDCL, his expulsion from the country effectively prevented MDCL from
pursuing its project and, therefore, constituted an indirect expropriation of MDCL’s
contractual rights in the project.”329

B. Compensable Indirect Expropriation

According to Jeswald W. Salacuse, some arbitral decisions suggest important clues
about the relationship between a compensable indirect expropriation and non-compensable
regulatory action.330 These factors include: (1) the degree of intensity of interference with
investor property rights; (2) the frustration of investors’ legitimate expectations; (3) lack
of proportionality; and (4) non-transparency, arbitrariness, and discrimination.331

(1) Degree of Interference with Investor Property Rights

Two elements play an important role in evaluating the degree of interference with
investor’s rights by governmental regulatory measures: the severity of the measure’s
impact on the investor’s control over the investment and the duration of the regulatory
measure.332

a. Severity of Economic Impact
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Tribunals deal with the degree of a governmental regulatory measure’s economic
impact as a matter of essential fact. 333 One question is whether the measures led to a
“substantial deprivation” of the investor’s investment in practice.334

The case of Philip Morris v Uruguay is illustrative. It discusses the fact that
Uruguay has one of Latin America’s highest rates of smokers:335 each year over 5,000
Uruguayans die from smoking-related diseases. 336 Smoking also has an economic
impact: 337 Uruguayan smokers spent large sums of money—an average of 20% of the
national minimum wage—on smoking-related health costs. 338 As such, smoking has
become a serious social problem in Uruguay and the country’s high smoking rate has had
a negative effect on public health and economic growth.339

To resolve this issue, Uruguay implemented anti-smoking policies and enacted its
own legislation.340 For example, Uruguay initiated a national tobacco control campaign
that led to a decrease in national smoking rates and started to regulate the tobacco
industry. 341 Uruguay, furthermore, implemented strict regulatory measures to control
tobacco, including a prohibition of smoking in enclosed spaces, increased taxation, and
restrictions on advertising.342 As of 2000, the government of Uruguay had implemented
many policies concerning the tobacco industry, and non-governmental expert groups had
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emphasized prevention of tobacco use. 343 Then, Uruguay became a party to the 2003
“Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC)” of the World Health Organization
(WHO).344
Philip Morris International eventually challenged some of Uruguay’s measures:
Ordinance 514 enacted on August 18, 2008, commonly known as the Single Presentation
Regulation or SPR, and Presidential Decree 287/009 enacted on June 15, 2009, commonly
known as the 80/80 Regulation.345 SPR required the printing of graphic and textual antismoking warnings on the lower half of cigarette packs. 346 SPR also did not allow any
cigarette brands to use variants:347 for instance, except for Marlboro Red, Philip Morris had
to eliminate their Light, Blue, and Fresh Mint variants. In addition, “the 80/80 Regulation
mandated an increase in the size of health warnings on cigarette packages from 50 to 80
per cent of the lower part of each of the main sides of every cigarette package.” 348 Philip
Morris International filed a suit against Uruguay at ICSID arbitration, “claiming that
Uruguay expropriated its investment and denied it fair and equitable treatment under the
Switzerland-Uruguay bilateral investment treaty (BIT).”349

Philip Morris ultimately failed in their action. The Tribunal dismissed the indirect
expropriation claim on the 80/80 Regulation: 350 “A limitation to 20% of the space
available to such purpose could not have a substantial effect on the Claimants’ business
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because it consisted only in a limitation imposed by the law on the modalities of use of the
relevant trademarks.”351 When it came to the other measure, according to the Tribunal, “in
order to determine whether the SPR had an expropriatory character, Philip Morris’s
business should be considered as a whole ‘since the measure affected its activities in their
entirety.’” 352 From this perspective, the Tribunal concluded that the SPR did not
substantially reduce the value of Philip Morris’s investment.353 As such, the Tribunal held
that the claim regarding an indirect expropriation failed; 354 they stated, “as long as
sufficient value remains after the implementation of the measure, there could be no indirect
expropriation.”355

b. Duration of the Governmental Measure

Another important element in deciding whether a government’s measure
constitutes an expropriation is the duration of the challenged measure.356 In the case of LG
& E, the Tribunal said, “generally, the expropriation must be permanent, unless the
investment’s successful development depends on the realization of certain activities at
specific moments that may not endure variations.”357 As such, the Tribunal “observed that
the effect of Argentina’s regulatory measures on the value of the Claimants’ investment
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has not been permanent.”358 Therefore, the Tribunal concluded that Argentina’s actions
were far from expropriation.359

(2) Frustration of the Investor’s Legitimate Expectations

Legitimate expectations play an important role in the interpretation of the fair and
equitable treatment standard and in the determination of an indirect expropriation. 360
Foreign investors decide to invest when they reasonably expect to gain economic
benefits.361 Most governments will encourage these expectations in order to attract foreign
investors’ investment.362

According to the Tribunal in Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, Metalclad
believed that the government of Mexico possessed the absolute authority to permit a
hazardous waste landfill.363
One of the significant factors for an indirect expropriation is the investor’s
legitimate expectation.364 Investors rely on a host State’s administrative measures, which
offer clear communication about the content of various public decisions. 365 However,
sometimes, a host State does not provide a foreign investor with its exact intention: in such
situations, a host State’s action can give rise to the problem of legitimate expectations. In
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this regard, by providing clear rules and communicating with the investor about a permit’s
revocation, the host State might simultaneously pursue both the investor’s interests and its
own environmental policy.366

(3) Lack of Proportionality

“In order to decide whether a government’s measure amounts to an indirect
expropriation, tribunals examined whether the challenged measure is reasonably
proportional to the government’s purpose.” 367 Usually, if the measure imposes an
excessive burden on foreign investors, a lack of proportionality might be found. 368 For
example, in Tecmed v Mexico the Tribunal considered “whether governmental regulatory
measures are proportional to the public interest protected and take into account the
protection granted to the investment.”369 The Tribunal stated, “There must be a reasonable
relationship of proportionality between the charge or weight imposed to the foreign
investor and the aim sought to be realized by any expropriation measure.”370 “To evaluate
such charge or weight, it is important how much the State actions affected the size of the
ownership deprivation and whether or not any deprivation was compensated.”371

(4) Non-Transparency, Arbitrariness, and Discrimination
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To determine whether the State’s action constituted an indirect expropriation, the
Tribunal also observes whether the challenged measure, or the process, was enacted
unclearly, arbitrarily, or discriminatorily. 372 For example, the Tribunal in Metalclad v
Mexico found that Metalclad relied on Mexican federal governmental regulatory measures
regarding their construction permit.373

In April 1993, Metalclad, a U.S. corporation, had entered into an option-topurchase agreement with COTERIN, a Mexican corporation, for constructing a hazardous
waste landfill.374 In May 1993, the government of San Luis Potosi permitted COTERIN a
state land use permit.375 Then, “in August 1993, the National Ecological Institute granted
COTERIN the federal permit for operation of the landfill.”376 One month later, Metalclad
exercised its option and purchased COTERIN, the landfill site.377

Metalclad then ran into difficulties. In October 1994, the Municipality of
Guadalcazar ordered a halt to Metalclad’s construction, because Metalclad had not
received a municipal construction permit. 378 To protect the interests of Guadalcazar’s
citizens, the municipality’s environmental representative requested Greenpeace Mexico’s
assistance.379 Furthermore, to examine the Environmental Assessment of the landfill, civil
society groups formed a citizen’s technical committee with geologists and civil
engineers.380 Although federal officials had the full authority to authorize construction,
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they suggested that Metalclad should apply for a local construction permit to maintain good
relations with the Municipality. 381

Metalclad submitted an application for a local

construction permit and started construction again. 382 However, the Municipality of
Guadalcazar denied the application.383
The Tribunal reviewed the Mexican government’s actions leading to the refusal of
the construction permit—and Metalclad’s inability to operate the hazardous waste
landfill—to determine whether the Mexican actions amounted to an indirect
expropriation.384 Metalclad asserted that the Municipality had no authority regarding all
hazardous waste matters.385 On the other hand, Mexico argued that the Municipality had
the authority to issue the construction permit.386 The Tribunal held that the Municipality
denied the local construction permit without a timely, orderly, or substantive basis.387

3. Environmental Regulations and Fair and Equitable Treatment

Most international investment treaties have a provision requiring fair and equitable
treatment (FET).388 Investors use this provision to challenge a host State’s environmental
regulations and measures in investor-State dispute settlements.389 “It is, for example, a
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common interpretation that the provision grants investors respect by the host State for their
legitimate expectations concerning the regulatory environment for the investments.”390

A. The Meaning of Fair and Equitable Treatment

The meaning of the phrase, fair and equitable treatment, is still mysterious.391 Even
though it has been completely examined over the past few years, it has not yet been clearly
defined.392 In many cases, tribunals have attempted to develop a definition for FET.393 In
doing so, “tribunals have relied on concepts such as the investor’s expectation,
transparency, justice, fairness, non-discrimination, arbitrariness, judicial propriety and
natural justice.”394 On the other hand, this method has made the definition of FET overly
general, and as such it cannot offer a useful standard for every case.395 Nevertheless, even
though arbitral tribunals do not yet use a completely consistent term, arbitral tribunals have
increasingly accepted these patterns of argumentation.396

B. Legitimate Expectation
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The protection of an investor’s legitimate expectation is an essential element of fair
and equitable treatment.397 The protection of such expectations includes the permanence
of promises and covenants that the investor has relied upon. 398 In addition, arbitral
tribunals have found that the protection of expectations is closely related to “a certain level
of stability and consistency in the legal framework of the host state.”399 The tribunal in
Tecmed said that:

The foreign investor expects the host State to act in a consistent manner,
free from ambiguity and totally transparently in its relations with the foreign
investor, so that it may know beforehand any and all rules and regulations
that will govern its investments, as well as the goals of the relevant policies
and administrative practices or directives, to be able to plan its investment
and comply with such regulations. Any and all State actions conforming to
such criteria should relate not only to the guidelines, directives or
requirements issued, or the resolutions approved thereunder, but also to the
goals underlying such regulations. The foreign investor also expects the
host State to act consistently, i.e. without arbitrarily revoking any
preexisting decisions or permits issued by the State that were relied upon by
the investor to assume its commitments as well as to plan and launch its
commercial and business activities.400

Changes to environmental regulations or permits might have an effect on an
investor’s investment plan.401 Typically, these two situations can involve infringement on
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the legitimate expectations of foreign investors; thus, this paper specifically needs to
review both changes to environmental regulations and permits.

(1) Changes in Environmental Regulations

Every country’s environmental protection policy or measure is continuously
changing 402 as “states and local communities continuously develop new standards and
goals for health and environmental protection.”403 New scientific knowledge and technical
developments result in continuously changing environmental regulations and increases to
health and environmental standards.404 For this reason, a host State will need to change its
environmental regulations for the public interest.405

The requirements on a State that changes its environmental regulations will vary.
Changes in environmental regulation do not inherently intrude on a foreign investor’s
legitimate expectation if there have been no concrete commitments between a host State
and foreign investors.406 In such situations, the host State can change its environmental
regulations without limitation, if the change helps public interests such as environmental
protection.407 However, if changes to environmental regulations will have a substantial
effect on an investor’s economic benefit, the host State should compensate for the
investor’s loss of benefit. 408 Therefore, when a host State changes or modifies its
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environmental regulation, it should consider whether the changed environmental regulation
considerably affects an investor’s economic benefit.

There is a good example of a change in governmental regulation. In the case of
Guaracachi America, Inc. and Rurelec PLC v. The Plurinational State of Bolivia, several
international companies were investing in Bolivia. A US company, Guaracachi America,
Inc. (GAI), and a British company, Rurelec Plc., invested in the Bolivian company,
Empresa Electrica Guaracachi S.A. (EGSA).409 Rurelec also indirectly owned Guaracachi
through a chain of BVI companies. The Claimants, Guaracachi and Rurelec, went to ICSID
arbitration against Bolivia under the authority of the USA-Bolivia and UK-Bolivia BITs,
with a grievance based on the 2010 nationalization of Guaracachi’s 50.001% shareholding
in Empresa Electrica Guaracachi S.A. and of additional assets owned by Rurelec’s
subsidiary, Energia para Sistemas Aislados Energis S.A.410

Since 1990, Bolivia had initiated extensive reforms to attract foreign investors and
had established a new regulatory structure that would allow the private business sector, in
particular, to participate in the electricity industry.411 “The cornerstone of the regulatory
framework was Law No. 1604 of 1994, (hereinafter, the ‘Electricity Law’), which
established the basic framework for the supply of electricity.” 412 “In addition, an
independent entity was created, the Electricity Superintendency (Superintendencia de
Electricidad, hereinafter, the ‘SSDE’), charged with the enforcement of the Electricity Law
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and the management of the electricity sector, and the National Power Dispatch Committee
(Comit Nacional de Despacho de Cargo, hereinafter, the ‘CNDC’), which was subject to
the oversight of the SSDE.”413 The new regulatory framework involved warranties on the
basis of efficiency, transparency, and quality.414
The Claimants alleged that Bolivia’s maintenance of the regulatory framework
made them liable. 415 On the basis of the developed regulatory framework and the
guarantees, GAI had invested in EGSA from the beginning of the 1990s.416 Later, Rurelec
decided to invest in EGSA, also based on the existing regulatory framework and those
guarantees.417 According to the Claimants, the regulatory change had a negative effect on
the profit of most private companies, such as EGSA.418 On the other hand, according to
the Respondent, the main purpose of the regulatory change was to find a way to institute a
proper pricing system, based on the principle of supply efficiency, and to pursue reasonable
environmental policy goals.419

BITs usually include a clause that offers fair and equitable treatment (FET) to
investors, and the Claimants claimed that Bolivia was in violation of the provision.
“According to the Claimants, the fair and equitable treatment standard is recognized as a
flexible concept, affording protection when State action is considered unfair.” 420 The
investor can demand protection of their interests if the host State’s action is in bad faith or
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has malicious intent. 421 At the time Claimants invested in Bolivia, they relied on
fundamental principles that considered the economic feasibility of the investment as the
most important factor, and they relied on the maintenance of the regulatory framework
governing spot prices. 422 However, according to the Claimants, these fundamental
principles were changed in 2008, and, in the end, the measures frustrated the investors’
legitimate expectations of stability and certainty.423
According to Bolivia, the Claimants interpreted the FET standard too broadly.424
The purpose of the FET standard is, indeed, to protect investor’s interests but with a limited
scope.425 “Thus, in the absence of a prior commitment by the State, the investor cannot
hold a legitimate expectation that the State will not exercise its power to modify the legal
framework applicable to the investment and no violation of the standard arises.”426 To find
a breach of the fair and equitable treatment standard under the BITs, the Claimants had to
demonstrate that Bolivia’s modified regulation was unreasonable or unjustified.427 “The
modifications did not constitute ‘the setting of prices that do not remunerate the investment
made nor allow reasonable profit to be granted,’ nor was this their intent.”428 “The changes
still allowed for reasonable profit to the point that even dividends were possible.”429 Thus,
Bolivia’s actions with respect to the capacity payment, and the method for calculation of
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the spot price, did not violate the rules,430 and the Tribunal said that GAI’s investment was
not related to Bolivia’s previous regulatory framework.431

The issue is whether the government of Bolivia had created a clear and objective
expectation, based on specific commitments, when the Claimants (investors) decided to
invest. According to Bolivia, “it made no guarantee that it would not nationalize the
electricity sector, and, in any event, the Claimants have not submitted any evidence of
such.”432 In addition, regarding the claim relating to spot price, the Tribunal reasoned “it
is not expected to determine the price that should be applied to generators, but rather to
determine whether the modification by Bolivia of the regulatory framework in relation to
spot prices frustrated the Claimants’ legitimate expectations in breach of the fair and
equitable treatment standard.” 433 As a consequence, in order to obtain an objective
expectation, investors should check if there are specific commitments between investors
and a State—this is because, after investors make an investment, investment situations such
as modification of regulatory frameworks are likely to occur often. Therefore, when
investors invest in foreign countries, they should know that they might have to bear the
burden or risk if there is a modification of the regulatory framework.

(2) Changes in Governmental Permits
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“The environmental permit in itself a strong representation of the host State
concerning the legality of the activity.” 434 Thus, an environmental permit inherently
contains a risk of infringement on the foreign investor’s legitimate expectation.435

There are two good examples of changes to environmental permits. In the case of
Metalclad v Mexico, the Tribunal reviewed whether the Mexican government’s acts
leading to the denial of a construction permit and subsequent inability to operate a
hazardous waste landfill constituted a breach of NAFTA’s Article 1105 on minimum
international standards of treatment. 436 The Tribunal found that Metalclad believed
government officials’ representations concerning all aspects of the investment. 437 For
example, the municipality required Metalclad to hold a local permit and suggested that it
would likely be issued.438 The Tribunal held that the investor was entitled to rely on the
representations of the federal officials, and therefore Mexico had violated the fair and
equitable standard; 439 the Tribunal said, “Mexico failed to ensure a transparent and
predictable framework for Metalclad’s business planning and investment.” 440

The

Tribunal also found that the Municipality’s action was not related to the actual construction
but was instead linked to social and environmental concerns concerning the site’s use as a
hazardous waste landfill.441 The Tribunal held that, because there were not any clear rules
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on the process for obtaining a construction permit, this constituted a breach of Article
1105.442

Furthermore, the Tribunal reasoned that Metalclad began constructing the landfill,
because it relied upon the representations of the federal government. 443 According to
Metalclad, “federal officials said that the Municipality would have no legal basis for
denying the permit.” 444 Moreover, “when the permit was denied at a meeting of the
Municipal Town Council, Metalclad had not received any notice and opportunity to
appear.” 445 “The absence of a clear rule as to the requirement or not of a municipal
construction permit, as well as the absence of any established or procedure as to the manner
of handling applications for a municipal construction permit amounts to a failure on the
part of Mexico to ensure a transparent and predictable framework for Metalclad’s business
planning and investment.”446
The Tribunal’s decision and rationales are worthy of criticism. The Tribunal did
not consider the health and safety of the citizens of Guadalcazar at all. The Municipality
denied the local construction permit because it perceived that the hazardous waste landfill
would have a negative effect on environmental protection.447 Citizens of the Municipality
had no choice but to oppose the landfill’s construction, because the site’s use as a hazardous
waste landfill was clearly detrimental to their health. I think that the Tribunal
overemphasized the investors’ legitimate expectations for stability and certainty.
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The other example of changes to environmental permits involves the case of
TECMED v Mexico. Applying a provision in the Spain-Mexico BIT that guaranteed fair
and equitable treatment, the Tribunal concluded that the provision required transparency
and protection of the investor’s basic expectations.448 It noted, in particular, “the foreign
investor also expects the host State to act consistently.”449 The Tribunal concluded that
Mexico’s actions frustrated the investor’s expectations:450 the actions were ambiguous and
uncertain, which impeded the right of the investor to have an advance assessment of the
legal situation and plan its business activity accordingly.451 The Tribunal found that the
Environmental Protection Agency failed to “report, in clear and express terms of its
intention to deny renewal.”452

There was ambiguity surrounding the requirements that TECMED had to meet.
TECMED believed that the government of Mexico had the authority to renew the operation
of the landfill.453 However, the Environmental Protection Agency canceled the permit to
operate the landfill and ordered its closure, because TECMED breached some terms of
environmental regulations.454 The Tribunal concluded that TECMED’s violation of the
environmental regulations was insignificant.455 Besides, the community group and civil
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society group’s opposition to the operation of the landfill was not a serious social
situation.456

This decision of the Tribunal is worthy of criticism. The landfill included hazardous
toxic waste, and it was close to a residential area. Even though TECMED’s violation of
environmental regulations was trivial, it could bring about serious environmental
contamination and threaten citizens’ health and safety. I think that the Environmental
Protection Agency’s measure—cancellation of permission—to protect the public health
was considerably justified.

C. Non-Discrimination

Unfair and inequitable treatment may result from state authorities’ discriminatory
behaviors toward foreign investors.457 The plain meaning of fair and equitable treatment
indicates that governmental regulatory measures that are discriminatory towards an
investor covered by an investment treaty will be violations of the fair and equitable
treatment standard. 458 In other words, fair and equitable treatment excludes arbitrary
governmental actions against investors.459 Inevitably, States justify their actions as a way
of protecting the public interest; on the other hand, the investors whose interests have been
impeded claim that the States’ measures were arbitrary and discriminatory. 460 Arbitral
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tribunals compare the types of treatment that investors received and look at whether the
state action has an arbitrary effect on investors.461 The tribunal in S.D. Myers said that:

The Tribunal considers that a breach of Article 1105 occurs only when it is
shown that an investor has been treated in such an unjust or arbitrary manner
that the treatment rises to the level that is unacceptable from the
international perspective. That determination must be made in the light of
the high measure of deference that international law generally extends to
the right of domestic authorities to regulate matters within their own borders.
The determination must also take into account any specific rules of
international law that are applicable to the case.462

In the case of Philip Morris v Uruguay, Philip Morris alleged that the Challenged
Measures, such as the SPR and the 80/80 regulations, were subjective. 463 The Tribunal
started their fair and equitable treatment (FET) analysis by addressing Philip Morris’s
allegations.464 To this end, the Tribunal reviewed each measure along with all the relevant
circumstances, including opinions regarding public policy determinations by national
regulatory agencies.465 According to the Tribunal, “the SPR was not an arbitrary, unjust,
or discriminatory measure but rather a reasonable measure.”466 In addition, “the 80/80
Regulation was a reasonable measure adopted in good faith to implement an obligation
assumed by the State under the FCTC.”467 As such, Uruguay abided by both its national
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and international legal obligations in protecting the public’s health.468 The Tribunal further
stated that both measures had been enacted in good faith and had been executed in a nondiscriminatory manner. 469 Moreover, the Tribunal pointed out that the measures were
adopted with scientific evidence, because they were based on the FCTC process.470
The Tribunal’s decision will have important ramifications. The government of
Uruguay implemented strict regulations on the tobacco industry to protect the public health
in 2009; the Tribunal in this dispute rejected Philip Morris International’s claims that its
investment in Uruguay had been expropriated and that Uruguay’s measures of tobacco
control were arbitrary. 471 From my point of view, Uruguay’s high smoking rate had
become a serious social problem. For this reason, Uruguay implemented its domestic
measures against the tobacco industry to resolve smoking-related problems. According to
the Tribunal, the measures were a reasonable exercise of the country’s sovereign right to
protect the public health.472 I believe this decision will affect other cases involving similar
issues. Specifically, in order to protect public goals, such as the fundamental rights to
health and environmental protection, it is likely that States will enforce measures that may
regulate investors’ interests.

D. Fair Procedure
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The new US Model BIT and many US FTAs explicitly stipulate the scope of
application of the fair and equitable treatment.473 “Fair and equitable treatment demands
that judicial and administrative procedures are shaped and exercised in a way that endows
the investor with the possibility to bring bear adequately his rights and interests.”474 Most
tribunals examine this aspect of the fair and equitable treatment in situations involving
denial of access to courts or inadequate and unjust procedures.475 For example, the tribunal
in Waste Management v Mexico defined a violation of the fair and equitable treatment as
“involving a lack of due process leading to an outcome which offends judicial proprietyas might be the case with a manifest failure of natural justice in judicial proceedings.”476
Furthermore, in Loewen v USA the tribunal found that “manifest injustice in the sense of a
lack of due process leading to an outcome which offends a sense of judicial propriety is
enough to identify a breach of fair and equitable treatment.”477

E. Transparency

Transparency requires that the host state’s investment-related legal framework and
procedures be as applicable to foreign investment as to domestic investment. 478 The
tribunal in Metalclad referred, for the first time, to the principle of transparency as an
element of fair and equitable treatment, while the tribunal in Tecmed interpreted the FET
“by putting it in the context of more concrete procedural principles and rights and
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expanding it to include the investor’s legitimate expectation.”479 In Metalclad v Mexico,
the Tribunal defined the concept of transparency as the idea that “all relevant legal
requirements for the purpose of investing should be capable of being readily known to all
investors.”480 Meanwhile, in Tecmed v Mexico the tribunal considered that:

This provision of the Agreement, in light of the good faith principle
established by international law, requires the Contracting Parties to provide
to international investments treatment that does not affect the basic
expectations that were taken into account by the foreign investor to make
the investment. The foreign investor expects the host state to act in a
consistent manner, free from ambiguity and totally transparent in its that
will govern its investments, as well as the goals of the relevant policies and
administrative practices or directives, to be able to plan its investment and
comply with such regulations.481

4. Conclusion

Foreign investors can bring a claim against a host State to international arbitration
if the host State violates a treaty that they agreed upon. Typically, when the host State’s
governmental measures amount to an indirect expropriation, or intrude upon the provisions
of fair and equitable treatment, foreign investors file an action against the host State. This
Chapter also discusses the importance of legitimate expectation—in the interpretation of
the FET and in the determination of an indirect expropriation—by analyzing many
investment arbitration cases. Furthermore, if changes to environmental regulations or
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permits substantially deprive foreign investors of their economic benefits, the host State
should compensate them for the loss of their economic benefits.

Every country can change its environmental regulations to improve public interests;
however, if the purpose of the governmental regulations is not reasonable, or the necessity
for the governmental measures is weak, then foreign investors’ legitimate expectations
could be impeded. Furthermore, if there are commitments between foreign investors and
the host State, they should abide by the commitments. As a result, it is important to find
the proper balance between the investors’ expectations and the State’s need to change
environmental regulations or permits.

In the case of changes to environmental regulations or permits, investor-State
disputes have stated that a host State’s authority should provide investors with exact
explanations about rules, and information about governance structure, to avoid unclear
communication. Furthermore, those in the investors’ position should confirm which
authority has the power to grant the relevant regulation or permit. By promoting
interactions between investors and government authorities, a host State can decrease
unnecessary constraints on environmental policy, while foreign investors can secure their
legitimate expectations.
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CHAPTER IV. SUGGESTIONS TO BALANCE BETWEEN U.S. INVESTORS
AND KOREAN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY

Environmental protection policies inherently involve long-term uncertainty and
considerable regulatory risks, which interfere with foreign investors’ legitimate
expectations. South Korea’s problems in this area include the government’s inconsistent
environmental policies and unilateral environmental policy enforcement. Furthermore,
frequently occurring political corruption in South Korea reduces public concern. These are
all elements that can not only decrease the transparency of Korean environmental policy
but also intrude on U.S. investors’ need for predictability regarding regulatory stability.
On the other hand, protection of U.S. investors’ interests could constrain Korean
environmental policy. Despite the fact that the investor-State dispute settlement system
inherently has many defects, protecting both U.S. investors’ interests and Korean
environmental policy is important. Therefore, to harmonize these two important interests,
this dissertation will suggest ways to reconcile Korean environmental protection policies
and US investors’ interests under the KORUS FTA; the following sections detail the
possible suggestions.

1. Amicus Curiae Participation: An Increase in Third-Party Participation

A. Characteristics of Amicus Curiae Participation

There are several characteristics inherent to amicus curiae participation. The rules
for proceedings in investor-State arbitration are similar to those for commercial arbitration,
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including certain privacy and confidentiality rights. 482 However, unlike commercial
arbitration, investor-State arbitration often examines the public interest—including issues
such as environmental protection—and implicates “government regulation aimed at the
protection of public welfare human rights, health and safety, and labor laws.”483 InvestorState arbitration pursues not only speed but also confidentiality: “arbitration offers parties
better efficiency by proceeding outside national judicial systems, because the resulting
arbitral awards are not normally subject to any appeal.”484 As a result, the proceeds and
contents of arbitral tribunals can be kept secret—completely confidential between both of
the parties. 485 Finally, investment arbitration tribunals initially involved no third-party
participation; 486 however, they eventually allowed limited third-party participation,
because of continuing public pressure and public opposition to the investment arbitration
system.487

B. Disadvantage of Amicus Curiae Participation

Amicus curiae play an important role in arbitration proceedings; however, there
have been many criticisms about them.488 “First, third-party participation can increase the
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practical burdens on the disputing parties.”489 In one case, the “tribunal emphasized the
need to ensure that third-party participation does not impose any additional burdens on the
parties or the arbitral process more generally.”490 Second, several commentators pointed
out that greater amicus curiae participation in investor-State disputes is likely to bring about
rising costs and delays.491 Amicus curiae participation not only increases the cost but also
creates needless delay for the parties, because parties must then spend a great deal of time
analyzing and responding to the amicus curiae submissions.492 As such, the amicus curiae
should perform a wide range of research before filing their amicus submissions.493
Arbitrators in investment disputes started restricting third parties’ participation in
disputes to written amicus briefs. 494 If third-party participation could pass beyond the
submission of written briefs—for example, if third parties could seek the discovery of
documents, be involved in evidence taking, or participate in oral arguments—it would lay
an excessive burden on the efficiency of the process.495 Furthermore, extending third-party
participation under such circumstances would undermine some of the advantages of
investor-State disputes, such as being quicker and more cost-efficient.496 Finally, increased
third-party participation would likely weaken the confidentiality and privacy in an investorState dispute.497 For example, investors fear that increased third-party participation would
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endanger their ability to keep sensitive information as secrets, such as trade secrets and
confidential matters.498

C. Advantage of Amicus Curiae Participation

Although extending amicus curiae participation beyond merely providing written
amicus briefs has several disadvantages in investment arbitration proceedings, it can also
contribute to facilitating positive investor-State dispute settlements. This is because
investment arbitration deals with both the investor’s interest and the public interest; 499
consequently, the arbitral tribunals have supported third-party participation in arbitral
proceedings.500 There are two reasons why investment treaty arbitrations have required
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) as amici curiae: 501 first is for their ability to
interpret “an investment treaty to increase harmonization and consistency and second is to
analyze the subject matters…within the dispute.”502 The civil societies strongly support
not only the protection of the public interest—such as environmental issues, labor welfare,
and human rights—but also the development of procedural openness in investment
arbitration.

503

Non-governmental organizations provide special skills, as well as

knowledge concerning important issues of public policy, within the dispute.504 Without
their participation, arbitrators and disputing parties might not proficiently deal with some
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issues, “such as ecological studies, environmental impact assessments, or cost-benefit
analyses regarding environmental policy.”505 As a result, the NGOs play an important role
in reaching a meaningful decision by the tribunal.506

From the perspective of the State, the State is not able to prepare for all relevant
controversies that might confront the arbitrators.507 Several factors might bring about this
situation:508 for instance, “the State might lack knowledge, evidence, or resources on some
issues.”509 In these situations, “amicus submissions provide factual, legal, and technical
information to the arbitral tribunal.”510 Therefore, the participation of the amicus curiae
improves the quality of the award. 511 Moreover, transparency has a positive effect on
investment arbitral proceedings:512 for instance, it reinforces the public credibility, and it
enhances the acceptability of the investment arbitral tribunal’s decision.513 The increased
transparency through the amicus submissions also provides a chance to offer greater
reliability to international investment arbitrations.514 Thus, amicus briefs play an important
role in maintaining the legitimacy of investment arbitrations.515

Amicus curiae participation might improve the quality of awarded legal remedies
and promote procedural transparency: in this respect, broadly expanding amicus curiae
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participation would help meet the need for better remedies and transparency when investorState arbitrations confront important public issues. Environmental issues that investment
arbitration tribunals deal with are very complicated. For example, environmental experts
might be required to evaluate the environmental value of particular regions. As such,
investment arbitration tribunals need environmental experts’ opinions and participation to
draw reasonable conclusions. For these reasons, it is necessary for third parties acting as
environmental experts to participate in public hearings and have access to important
documents related to the suits in the investment arbitral proceeding. However, most of the
investment arbitration cases have enabled third parties only to file written amicus curiae
submissions.

2. The Application of Proportionality Analysis

A. Concept of Proportionality Principle

Proportionality describes a proportional relation of one part to another; it is
fundamentally connected to the concepts of equilibrium and balancing.516 This analysis,
as developed by the European Court of Human Rights, has influenced the approach of
investor-state arbitration tribunals when “applying treaty provisions to governmental
measures that allegedly amount to indirect expropriation.”
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Arbitrators use the

proportionality test to estimate the impact of the State’s measures on the investment.518
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Essentially, international investment treaties pursue two important goals: 519 The
first purpose is for States not to discriminate against foreign nationals and corporations.520
The other purpose is for States not to appropriate the foreigners’ property without
compensation.521 However, when a State fails to fulfill these treaty purposes, it can lead
to neutral third-party adjudication through arbitral tribunals. 522

The principle of

proportionality is a useful method to solve such conflicts in many domestic and some
international courts.523 Providing for an appropriate balance between individual rights and
the public interest is its most significant purpose:524 in other words, to provide for a fair
balance between investors’ rights and the public interest.525 Some tribunals have already
used the principle of proportionality.526 On the other hand, most of those tribunals have
not described why the principle of proportionality analysis was needed, or how it applied
in real cases.527

B. The Application of the Proportionality Principle in TECMED SA v. Mexico Case

Arbitral Tribunals mainly focus on the question of whether the State’s conduct is
reasonable and whether it is associated with rational policies. 528 Unfortunately, most
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arbitral awards have not explained well what the notion of reasonableness has meant for
their particular Tribunal.529 Only some awards explain that the reasonableness of a State’s
measure is to be determined by balancing the interests of the foreign investor and the host
state:530 one of the best examples is the TECMED case.

In the case of TECMED SA v. Mexico, the tribunal clearly explained an elaborate
concept of proportionality.531 In its assessment of an alleged expropriation, the tribunal
required “a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the effects and the goal of a
measure, and that the relevant factors must be weighted when trying to assess the
proportionality of the action adopted with respect to the purpose pursed by such
measure.” 532 When the principle of proportionality is applied, first, the case should
examine whether both the private interest and the public interest exist or whether there are
other conflicting interests: 533 The principle of proportionality can balance conflicting
interests and restrain the right of discretion.534 Second, the case should examine whether
the host country has broad discretion to regulate investments by choosing different
measures;535 essentially, when deciding which measure to utilize, States tend to have wide
discretion in matters related to the national or public interests.536 However, the government
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cannot properly consider a measure if the adopted measure’s effect would be more
excessive than necessary or if the need for the measure drops considerably.537
In Tecmed v Mexico, the benefit to Tecmed (investor) was impeded considerably.538
However, Mexico had the power to define “the issues that affect its public policy or the
interests of society as a whole, as well as the actions that will be implemented to protect
such values.” 539

The case is illustrative of the fact that when the principle of

proportionality is applied, an arbitral Tribunal can examine whether the regulatory measure
breaches a balance between private rights and public interests, and they can also examine
whether there was an abuse of regulatory power to promote the host State’s potential and
economic interests.540

It appears that several tribunals used proportionality analysis in determining
whether a certain regulatory measure amounted to an indirect expropriation or to fair and
equitable treatment. As one scholar observed in the application of this proportionality
analysis, “it is obvious that the pendulum will not necessarily always swing in the direction
of the investor’s interest.” 541

Ultimately, the public interest in matters such as

environmental protection should be balanced against the investor’s interest.

Thus,

international investment tribunals should use the proportionality analysis continuously and
obligatorily when examining whether the negative financial impact of regulatory measures
on foreign investments is proportional to the public interest.
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3. Increase in Transparency of Korean Environmental Policy

As mentioned in Chapter II, South Korea’s rankings for policy stability and
transparency in government policymaking are both low, according to the World Economic
Forum. These factors—South Korea’s policy instability and opaque government
policymaking—are related to insufficient national consensus and public participation. In
other words, policy-makers do not collect various public opinions before implementing
new environmental regulations.

As such, the problem of South Korea’s unilateral

environmental policy enforcement remains to be solved. Political corruption also has a
negative effect on environmental policy in South Korea; “Political corruption’s effect in
reducing the strength of environmental programs is particularly pronounced in situations
where manufacturing industry is politically mobilized.” 542 This improper relationship
between politicians and the business community continuously affects the environmental
policymaking processes in South Korea.

Reinforcing public participation in environmental decision-making processes is
very important to increase the transparency of environmental policy. “Transparency can
explain how decisions are made and who influences those decisions.”543 In the case of
Philip Morris, Uruguay’s high smoking rate brought about many social problems related
to the nation’s public health.544 As of 2000, the government of Uruguay had implemented
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many policies concerning the tobacco industry and non-governmental expert groups had
started to emphasize prevention of tobacco use. 545

The government of Uruguay

implemented anti-smoking policies and enacted its own legislation: 546

“The new

regulation mandated an increase in the size of health warnings on cigarette packages from
50 to 80 per cent of the lower part of each of the main sides of every cigarette package.”547
The Philip Morris case ultimately gave South Korea’s policy makers some good
ideas. For example, whenever the Korean government needs changes to environmental
regulations, it should provide the public with correct information and reasonable rationales
for the changes to the environmental regulations and gain a public consensus. I think that
such a step-by-step procedure prior to enacting new policies would protect foreign
investors’ legitimate expectations.

4. Explanation Regarding the Introduction of Policies

Arbitration tribunals determine indirect expropriation on a case-by-case and factspecific basis.548 Therefore, evidence preservation and evidence related to the proof of
content are very important. For example, states will be better able to explain why policies
were enacted if records of the procedures and legislative histories associated with the
introduction of those policies are well preserved. This legislative intent could provide
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states with an important component in their defense against a claim of appropriation at
arbitration.

In practice, even though information on pending and recent legislation is available
from the government website of Korea or the national archives of Korea, a problem is that
the meaning of terminology and the intended purpose of the legislation can be ambiguous.
Furthermore, there is still not enough information about legislative history in the
Congressional records. Thus, the Korean government should not only provide useful
background information about legislative records to the public but also describe the
legislature’s intent and purposes regarding the legislation, along with minority views.

In most investor-state arbitrations, states or arbitrators examine statutes that were
foundational to the introduction of the contested policies. Therefore, having extensive
records can enable states to explain why the disputed policies were introduced, as well as
the legislative intent behind them. Given these points, the government of South Korea
should record the legislative purpose and intent of their statutes in order to provide specific
and concrete evidence for the underlying rationale of their policies. Furthermore, by being
able to adequately record statutes’ legislative intent and purpose, the South Korean
government might also be in a better position to clearly define and interpret its own
environmental policies.

5. Clear Definition of Indirect Expropriation
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The definition and application of an indirect expropriation is often ambiguous and
difficult; it is thus necessary for the provisions’ definitive and interpretive criteria to be
clear. For example, under the KORUS FTA, “the agreement’s expropriation provisions
have been clarified in two annexes to ensure that they are consistent with U.S. legal
principles and practice, including a clarification that non-discriminatory regulatory actions
designed and applied to protect the public welfare do not constitute indirect expropriation
‘except in rare circumstances.’”549 However, we never know whether and to what extent
the rare circumstances will be found: only dispute arbitrators are able to decide.

When interpreting the KORUS FTA, the tribunal confronts interpretive difficulties
inherent in determining the parties' intent and the textual meaning of the treaty's provisions.
By using extra-textual sources and drafting history, which reveals the parties’ underlying
intent and purpose, drafters and interpreters can address the interpretive difficulties. 550
Furthermore, an investment treaty signed by two countries’ agreement should be
interpreted in the light of its object and purpose as agreed to by both parties’ mutual
consent.551 In this regard, both parties need a consensus on models or methods; the treaty
should not be interpreted in accordance with only one party's intent. 552 Finally, the
meaning of the specific terms used is important, because the text of treaties is often
deliberately ambiguous; 553 deliberate ambiguity promotes international cooperation and
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provides leaders with political flexibility when seeking ratification of a treaty. 554 This
ambiguity, however, is fatal when seeking reliable and consistent interpretations in
arbitration. 555 However, by using a compilation of key terminology, both parties can
clarify ambiguous treaty provisions.
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555
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Id.
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CONCLUSION

This dissertation reviewed whether there is a possibility that U.S. investors will
bring a claim against South Korea for infringing their property rights, because the Korean
government’s environmental measures may amount to an indirect expropriation or a breach
of fair and equitable treatment under the KORUS FTA. In reaching this review, first, this
dissertation discussed changes to environmental regulations. Every country can change its
environmental regulations because new concerns about environmental quality, along with
the development of new technology, can result in changing needs for environmental
regulations. However, these changes to environmental regulations can either guarantee or
decrease foreign investors’ predictability. Therefore, entities in the State’s position should
consider the necessity for changes to environmental regulations or permits and how such
changes might affect foreign investors’ predictability.

Second, this dissertation introduced important elements for a good environmental
policy design. According to Sterner, various elements such as sustainability, equity
concerns, and transparency are needed to properly satisfy environmental goals. States can
create more desirable environmental policies through a harmonization of these various
elements. However, Korea’s environmental policy has many problems.
Third and last, this dissertation examined the disadvantages of Korea’s
environmental policy. As mentioned in Chapter II, Korea’s rankings for policy instability,
transparency of government policymaking, and burden of government regulation are low.
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The first reason for these rankings appears to be the government’s inconsistent
environmental policies and unilateral policy enforcement. As such, a lack of national
consensus and public participation arises in the policymaking process. The second reason
for the rankings is that political factors have a negative effect on the environmental
policymaking processes; for instance, the previous administration’s environmental policy
might be abolished or postponed by a new administration. The last reason involves
political corruption: the big corporations, such as Samsung, support the government and
obtain improper benefits from it. This improper relationship between politicians and
business might reduce the transparency of the government’s policymaking processes.
These are all elements that can reduce U.S. investors’ predictability.

Based upon the analysis above, I conclude that U.S. investors are likely to file an
action against the Korean government in international arbitration, because the
government’s measures amount to either an indirect expropriation or a breach of fair and
equitable treatment.

Besides which, if the government’s environmental measures

substantially infringe upon U.S. investors’ economic benefits, the government of Korea
should compensate them for their economic loss.

International investment treaties provide protective provisions for foreign investors
to insure against State’s regulatory risks. On the other hand, investment treaties also
include provisions for the protection of public interests, such as environmental conditions,
when it comes to permissible governmental measures. The KORUS FTA has similar
provisions regarding the protection of foreign investors and public interests. As a result,
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the tension between these two important interests naturally arises. For this reason, this
dissertation suggests ways to balance between U.S. investors’ interests and Korean
environmental protection policy.

The current ISDS system inherently possesses many formational problems, such as
a lack of transparency and the fact that the appointed arbitrators’ untrustworthiness can
result in constraints on a host State’s regulatory space. This dissertation’s first suggestion
in this regard is to increase third party participation to increase the transparency of the
current ISDS system. Arbitrators should allow third party participation, as environmental
experts, to extend beyond the submission of written amicus briefs: permitting not only their
participation in public hearings, but also granting access to important documents. The
second suggestion involves the application of proportionality analysis. The appointed
arbitrators have the authority to interpret and apply investment treaties; however, each
arbitrator interprets and applies investment treaties in a different manner. For this reason,
it is difficult to foresee their decisions. It is very important that foreign investors’ interests
should be balanced against public interests, such as health and environmental protection.
However, one problem is that only some international investment arbitrations have used
the proportionality analysis. Better results would be obtained if they used this principle
continuously and obligatorily in determining whether the government measures amounted
to an indirect expropriation or a breach of fair and equitable treatment. The third suggestion
involves an increase in transparency regarding Korean environmental policy. South
Korea’s unstable and unclear governmental policymaking triggers a lack of public
participation. Increasing the transparency of Korean environmental policymaking would
reinforce public participation in environmental decision-making processes. As a result,
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this idea could result in clearer predictability for U.S. investors. The fourth suggestion is
that there should be a clear explanation regarding the introduction of policies. In most
investor-State arbitrations, arbitrators have examined statutes’ legislative purpose and
intent. In South Korea’s position, if records of the procedures and legislative histories—
that are the basis for the introduction of their policies—are well preserved, South Korea
will be able to explain why those policies were introduced, along with providing the
intended purpose of the legislation. By providing a clear explanation regarding the
introduction of their policies, Korean environmental policy could be prevented from facing
arbitration-imposed constraints. The dissertation’s last suggestion in this regard is the need
for clear treaty provisions. Unclear treaty provisions have a negative effect, resulting in
inconsistent treaty interpretations within arbitrations. Thus, both of the parties that agreed
upon the treaty should clarify ambiguous treaty provisions.

Considering all of the above, there is a high possibility that U.S. investors will bring
a claim against the government of Korea to the International Centre for Settlement of
Investment Disputes, because the government’s environmental measures amounted to an
indirect expropriation and a breach of fair and equitable treatment. If the government of
South Korea loses such a suit, U.S. investors could strike down Korean environmental law
and policy. For this reason, as mentioned previously, this dissertation has suggested ways
to balance between U.S. investors’ rights and Korean environmental protection policy.
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